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THE POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN SPORT IN THE
SOVIET UNION

by



HARTFORD A. CANTELON JR.

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Political Involvement in Sport in the Soviet Union" submitted by Hartford A. Cantelon Jr. in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

Politics have been associated with sports since the Greek city states honoured victorious citizens on their return from the Olympic Games. Modern day nations all associate politics with sports. The only difference occurs in the amount of political involvement each country imposes.

The integration of sports with the political state became readily apparent for example, during the Hitler regime in Germany. Sports and sportsmen were used as tools to help forward the political doctrine of the Nazi party. Today the Soviet Union provides a contemporary example of a nation with a fully integrated political sports policy.

Many of the accomplishments of Soviet sportsmen have resulted because of this state control and political involvement. The profound success Soviet athletes have achieved in the past two decades speaks well for the state control of physical culture. The use of sports to combat juvenile delinquency, improve health and make better use of leisure time are admirable political uses of sport. However, in the Soviet Union, physical culture and sports cannot be viewed as an end in themselves; this activity must further CPSU ideals and is therefore a matter of interest to Party apparatus.

The political control of the entire Soviet society finds its historical roots in the philosophy of Marx. Through observation of the highly-industrialized society of his day, Marx predicted a class struggle between proletarian workers and bourgeois capitalists. When the workers realized the hopelessness of the capitalist system, they would

revolt, overthrowing the bourgeoisie. Socialist society would grow out of this conflict and fill the void left by the revolution. Lenins, as the founder of the Bolshevik Party, interpreted Marxian philosophy to fit the particular Russian scene and attempted to establish the first modern communist state. This society was to be governed by the proletarian dictatorship until the state became obsolete.

To this end, the Communist Party controls all facets of Soviet life, either directly through the Party apparatus or indirectly through the government -- Council of Ministers -- and other, quasi-political, bodies. Nothing operates beyond the control of the Party, including sports. Sports can be regarded as a sub-culture of the total Soviet society and for this reason has many of the same advantages and disadvantages a completely planned society experiences.

The complex organizational structure of the CPSU is apparent in the structure of the Union of Sports Societies and Organizations of the USSR. The efficient mobilization of citizens is apparent during the spartakiads. Reliance on scientific investigation and research has allowed Soviet researchers to develop many practical and useful applications for sports.

The problem of centrally planning an entire society is noticeable -- in the sports field -- in the number of complaints concerning quality sports equipment, the lack of good facilities and qualified physical education teachers, as well as the difficulty of fulfilling state plans.

In the early days of the Soviet state, sports were developed according to the massovost' principle (mass participation). Today in the Soviet Union mass participation is considered secondary to that of

masterstvo (proficiency). Because of the use of the sports arena as a proving ground for the superiority of the communist system, masterstvo is of primary importance. The emphasis on masterstvo has created a widening gap between the elite athlete and the ordinary sportsman in terms of facilities, equipment and skill development. It has also produced the state amateur and the problems associated with the preferential treatment of these athletes, i.e., rowdiness, drunkenness, parasitism and recruitment.

Party leaders do not view sports as good in themselves but as a tool of the Party. The CPSU does not support sport participation because of the higher values physical exertion can bring but rather in strict materialistic terms. Sports must further the Party cause both in the Soviet Union and abroad and for this reason is directed and controlled by the Party.

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INTRODUCTION

Russia is not a country, but a world.
--Old Russian proverb

The following description of the people and languages clarifies the existence of such a proverb.

At the present time the U.S.S.R. comprises 15 union republics. By far the largest both in area and in population is the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, with a population in 1959 of 117.5 million, five-sixths Russian speaking and the remainder representing many small nationalities pocketed within Great Russia. Two other republics speak Slavic languages closely akin to Russian: the Ukraine (41.9 million), and Byelorussia ... (8.1 million). In Transcaucasia there are three republics: Georgia (4 million), Armenia (1.8 million), and Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan (3.7 million). Four more republics, whose inhabitants speak Turkic languages, are located in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, occupying a large area of steppe and desert (9.3 million, more than half of whom are Russians and Ukrainians); Kirgizia (2.1 million); Uzbekistan (8.1 million); and Turkmenia (1.5 million). The fifth Central Asian republic, on the Afghan border, is Iranian-speaking Tajikistan (2 million). Finally, there are the four western republics annexed during World War II: the three Baltic states of Estonia (1.2 million), Latvia (2.1 million), and Lithuania (2.7 million), and the Rumanian-speaking province of Bessarabia, which is called the Moldavian Republic (2.9 million). Other important nationalities are the five million Tatars on the Volga River in the Russian Republic and the two and a quarter million Jews scattered through the European part of the Soviet Union.¹

Early historians picture the disorganization of this vast land, covering "approximately one sixth of the earth's land surface."² Individual tribes, constantly warring and bickering with one another, stalled the spread of civilization into Russia. Not only did this retard social and cultural development of the peasant population but caused an intellectual vacuum as well. Peasants were almost completely

uneducated³ and under the often-times cruel and insensitive treatment of their feudal lords. They were frequently tortured.

I have been at tables, where, for some trifling fault, the master had coolly ordered a footman a hundred blows with a stick, as a mere matter of course...⁴

Peasants were given as much status as beasts of burden.

The owner has also the power of selling his slaves, or hiring his labour to other persons; and it happens sometimes that a Knaez, or Boyard [Boyar] shall give his slave to a neighbouring Boyard in exchange for a dog or a horse.⁵

The feudal lords were not the only stumbling bloc towards the education of the peasants. Climate also hindered the spread of education. Although very similar to the climate of Canada and the Northwest Territories, for the pioneering Europeans, it presented a formidable task to survive a winter in Russia. Because of the harsh winters, those people who may have expressed a desire to help educate the peasants, were often discouraged.⁶

With the almost constant warring,⁷ the insensitivity of tribe with tribe, the disparity and cruelty of life styles of nobles and peasants, the lack of education and literacy⁸ and the fact that until 1861, the peasants toiled under a feudal system, it is small wonder sport in tsarist Russia was limited, cruel, of a chance nature and primarily military.

John Nash has stated that "the test of a civilization is how it uses its leisure time."⁹ Russians on the whole did not have any free time, particularly the peasants, as the following quotation exemplifies.

My time is all spent in the mill -- from five o'clock in the morning until eight o'clock at night. My wife and two daughters

work on the fields belonging to the baron five days a week in summer. They get no wages. In winter they do any kind of work required of them by the steward. My son (who is seventeen years old) works also in the mill, and gets two roubles a month.¹⁰

The nobility did enjoy freedom from menial tasks and to a great extent engaged in spectator sports.

One other special recreation is the fight with wild Bears, which are caught in pits or nets, and are kept in barred cages for that purpose, against the Emperor be disposed to see that pastime. The fight with the Bear is of this sort. The man is turned into a circle walled round about, where he is to quite (sic) himself so well as he can...¹¹

Hunting¹² and passive card and gambling games¹³ were also popular.

This lack of physically strenuous sporting outlets was not above comment by visitors to the Soviet Union.

The Russians struck me as a people exceedingly ill-provided with manly amusements. They have nothing to correspond to our cricket, boating or football. Their young men seem incapable of rising to any greater exertion of mind or body than that demanded for billiards, cards, drinking, and smoking.¹⁴

Indigenous social groups did have unique amusements which were based on their cultural background. For example, the Cossacks, magnificent horsemen of the Don River and Steppe region, amused themselves with the agility and acrobatics of horsemanship, as well as participating in mock battle scenes.

They [the Cossacks] are very fond of performing various feats of horsemanship called the "Djigitoffka." A number of them form up in line, the spectators being a distance of two or three hundred yards in front. Turn by turn they advance, their horses going at fullest speed. One rushes along with his head nearly to the ground, righting himself as he passes; a second stands on his head upon the saddle; a third stands

upright; a fourth is stretched lengthways across. Next you see a barebacked steed coming, and as it passes, the report of a gun draws your attention to the cavalier hanging along its side, and firing from beneath its neck. Now come two together at furious speed, the foremost one with loose clothes fluttering in the wind -- this one represents a woman and the man behind is in pursuit. As they pass, the pursuer rushes up, whips the other from the saddle and bears him off. Others, in full career, pick up coins and perform various antics too numerous to mention; suffice it to say, these sons of the steppe are consummate horsemen.¹⁵

... -- a shriek -- a pistol fired, were the signals of battle -- the troop was obliged to divide in order to face an enemy that attacked it on all sides. ...Some flung themselves off their horses to tear their foe to the ground; alternately they pursued or were pursuing, their pikes, their pistols, their hang-ers all were made use of; and when the parties were completely engaged together; it was difficult to see all the adroit manoeuvres that passed.¹⁶

The Kalmyks [Kalmucks] were as adept with the bow as the Cossacks were at horsemanship. "These Calmoucks are so dexterous with bows and arrows that one killed a goose at a hundred paces, and the other broke an egg at fifty."¹⁷ The Bashkirs, on the other hand, had "their diversions at religious festivals, or at a marriage, [consisting] in numerous libations of sour milk, singing, dancing, wrestling, and horse racing, in which they excel."¹⁸

Primarily, the people toiled upon the soil, attempting to forge a meagre existence from the unfriendly environment. When they did gather -- usually at religious feasts, marriages, or market days -- their activities reflected the harsh lives they lived. Fist fights were common market day occurrences, and of such a brutal nature they were prohibited by the Church and civil authorities. Gosow witnessed one such fight and gave the following account.

But the driver lost his temper, and with a wide flourish struck the first blow right in the breast.

The blacksmith staggered, trembling from head to foot under the heavy blow, but held his ground. "Now my turn," he said.

Neither defended himself, but each received the strokes in plain figure. For almost two minutes they gave and received the fearfulest blows. When, struck on the temple, the huge driver fell in a heap (three weeks later he died of inflammation of the brain), over his body the suburbans rushed on their enemies, -- ...

In this fight almost eight hundred persons took part. During the first quarter of our century, such fights were not infrequent among students of rival schools.¹⁹

Persons studying sport in the Soviet Union are amazed at the gains achieved from such an unstable and bleak background. Since 1952, when the Soviet Union entered the Olympic Games, it has been the leader in unofficial point totals in 1956, 1960, 1964 and second to the United States in 1952 and 1968. Of notable interest to Canadian sports enthusiasts is the fact that the Soviet Union recently claimed their tenth consecutive world championship in amateur hockey. This feat is more remarkable when one considers that the Soviet Union did not enter international hockey competition until 1952.

What has accounted for this great sporting success and development? The majority of Soviet successes or failures, not only in sport but in all aspects of Soviet life, can be traced to the political apparatus -- The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Article #126 of the Soviet Union Constitution substantiates this claim.

In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activism among the masses of people, citizens of the U.S.S.R. shall be guaranteed the right to unite in social organizations -- trade unions, co-operative associations, youth organizations, sports and defence organizations, cultural,

technical, and scholarly societies; and the most active and conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class, the toiling peasantry and the laboring intelligentsia shall be voluntarily united in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which shall be the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to build communist society and the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both social and state.²⁰

In order to understand the organizational structure of sporting bodies, the success and failure of sports and sportsmen, it is necessary to examine the political structure and its all-encompassing power. Chapter one will deal with the revolutionary beginnings of the Communist Party, Lenin's interpretation of Marx, and the policies Lenin implemented when the Bolsheviks gained control.

Chapter two will examine the Party apparatus, the influence and control the higher Party organs impose on the lower bodies as well as the control of the state apparatus.

Chapter three will focus on sports in the Soviet Union. The organizational structure of the sporting apparatus is very similar to the model of the Party and state organs. Athletes are expected to fulfill quotas and plans as do workers in other facets of Soviet life.

Comments by Soviet sportsmen provide an insight into the political influence. In the early days of Bolshevik rule in Russia, Kogan wrote:

From the point of view of the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat, chess is not an end in itself, but a means of raising the cultural (and thereby also the political) level of the labouring masses of the world.²¹

Similarly, after winning her third consecutive world speedskating title, Isakova told a Pravda interviewer:

In response to the concern for us on the part of the Party, the government, and the great Stalin, Soviet athletes are prepared to exert every effort to reach new heights of sport prowess.²²

Although the Soviet system provides a classic example of political infringement in the sports arena, one should not assume political interference does not occur elsewhere. As Naton so succinctly states:

Today the nations of the world rank differently according to the amount of interest their governments take in the organization of sport. On the one side, are those states whose sport is fully integrated in the political system and thus becomes an important instrument in Government policies. At the other end of the scale are found those countries in which sport is organized by independent bodies and is itself free of any political organization save when it involves international competition. ... In a world where success in sport and play is considered as a measure of national vitality and national prestige, one must be reconciled to the fact that sport has become the tool of politics.²³

The Soviet Union provides an example of the sports program fully integrated in the political system. Political infringement occurs elsewhere but is often less apparent than in the Soviet Union.

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CHAPTER ONE

ORIGINS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY APPARATUS

Marxism

Communism dates back to the dawn of western political thought when Plato expounded his utopian state in the Republic. However it is Karl Marx whose name is usually associated with communism, notably because it is his work, The Communist Manifesto, that is read and interpreted like the Christian reads and interprets the Bible.

Marxists throughout the world enter into this interpretative argument. Russian socialists split over differing interpretations of Marx. Trotsky was expelled from the Party because of his beliefs. More recently, Chinese communists accuse the Soviet Union of false interpretation of Marx's writings.

Hegel's Philosophical Influence

Karl Marx studied law at the Universities of Bonn and Berlin, where he encountered the philosophy of Hegel. Hegelian philosophy was in vogue at this time and Marx was not only interested in it but greatly influenced by it. Hegel had been a universalist who attempted through his philosophical system to explain the changes in the world. Unlike others before him, Hegel did not develop a system characterized by a static world. His system had change built into it. "For the first time, thinkers made their peace with movement instead of insisting on a static universe."¹ Hegel called this process of change the "dialectic". In essence it consisted of the following:

A principle or idea -- the thesis -- was challenged by its opposite -- the antithesis. From their conflict there emerged not a victory of one side or the other, but a combination of the two -- the synthesis. In time this new thesis was again challenged by a new antithesis. A new synthesis emerged, and thus mankind rolled forward and upward.²

This process would continue until the ideal state would be reached and the dialectic would terminate.

Marx agreed with Hegel's concept of the dialectic reaching the ideal and then dissolving but he was at variance with the origin of the conflict. Whereas Hegel saw the conflict as beginning with the ideas themselves, Marx felt the conflict was found in the world and the ideas of dialectic were the result of this conflict. This conflict is now labeled with the phrase, "dialectical materialism". As Marx wrote:

... the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea", he [Hegel] even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world. ...With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.³

Feuerbach's Materialistic Influences

The idea of materialism came from the influence of Ludwig Feuerbach. Feuerbach had broken with the idealism of Hegel and began the concept of materialism. Marx felt Feuerbach had not taken the concept of materialism far enough and as a consequence, Feuerbachian philosophy contained at least three major shortcomings. Firstly, Feuerbach had concerned himself mainly with mechanical materialism. This greatly limited his philosophy in that it did not recognize the advancements being made in chemistry and biology at that time. Secondly, the materialism was non-historical and non-dialectical. This meant a complete

rejection of the evolution of the dialectic and the historical. Thirdly, and of utmost importance to the revolutionary thinking Marx, Feuerbach did not attempt a change-producing materialism but merely an interpretation of the world of his day.

Marxian Doctrine

Therefore Marx built upon the foundations he had gained from studying Hegel and Feuerbach and produced his now famous doctrine. The work of producing this doctrine was the result of collaboration and help from his lifelong friend, Friedrich Engels. Engels often provided a monthly sum to support Marx and his family and also published his own momentous work on The Condition of the Working Class in England. Building on this early work, Hegelian and Feuerbachian philosophy and the French socialist theories and revolution, Marx and Engels proceeded to write the doctrine expounded, interpreted and officially claimed by the modern day Communist countries. Lenin said:

Marxism is the system of Marx's views and teachings. Marx was the genius who continued and consummated the three main ideological currents of the nineteenth century, as represented by the three most advanced countries of mankind: classical German philosophy, classical English political economy, and French socialism combined with French revolutionary doctrines in general.⁴

Basically, Marx and Engels decided the economic system of a society was the primary factor in all facets of this society. This meant social conditions, theoretical knowledge, political structure and religion are all imposed upon the economic base. Where a society stands economically at any point in time will influence all other conditions. Following the dialectics of Hegel, Marx reasoned that society proceeds from the

subsistence economy through feudal, capitalist and socialist stages, finally reaching the ideal communist society. Each stage does not necessarily evolve gradually into the next. The evolution is dependent upon numerous factors, one of which is the manner in which authority is relinquished. In some cases this may voluntarily occur. In others there may be violence and revolution. This is particularly true of the transition from capitalism to socialism. By studying the highly-industrialized England and Western Europe of his day, Marx predicted a class revolution that would overthrow the capitalists, with the workers gaining control. Capitalism was an important stage for every society to pass through, as it abolished the many small minority factions of earlier societies. Capitalism unified these minorities and the result was the creation of two hostile camps.

Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.⁵

Marx believed these were the only classes because of the industrialization occurring in society. As society became more and more dependent on machines and increased efficiency, the masses were forced to rely on money to purchase consumer goods. This dependency on money produced the revolutionary proletariat. "The other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry; the proletariat is its special and essential product."⁶ The proletariat becomes revolutionary because of the private owners in industry. Since Marx maintained that wage scales were dictated by the bourgeoisie, proletarians had no means of reaching the upper class society. Marx discerned that the bourgeoisie

wished to attain maximum profits and would therefore fix wages at the lowest amount possible. In essence Marx expounded the old adage "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer." This results in a revolutionary proletariat, suspicious of every bourgeois institution and practice.

The proletarian is without property; his relation to his wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeoisie family relations; modern industrial labour, modern subjection to capital, the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois interests.⁷

The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation. They have nothing of their own to secure and to fortify; their mission is to destroy all previous securities for, and insurances of, individual property.⁸

When the proletarians finally view the situation as hopeless, they revolt and overthrow their capitalist overlords. It is at this stage socialism is introduced. In Marx's view, the workers would gain control of production and "the mission of the proletariat as such would come to an end. Abolishing private property and the class differences which rested on it, the proletariat itself would cease to exist as a class; the proletarian negation of capitalist society would be dialectically superseded by the classless society of communism."⁹ In other words, when the proletariat finally realize the hopelessness of capitalism, they revolt and gain control. Instead of becoming capitalists themselves, they simply allow classes to disappear, and communism to emerge. Marx did not foresee the utopian communist society immediately after socialism occurred. He noted that:

... these defects [the bourgeoisie right of payment according to the individual's labour] are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is when it has just emerged after prolonged birth pangs from capitalist society. ...

In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a means of life but life's prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly -- only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!"¹⁰

Leninism

Lenin, like Marx, was not naive enough to believe the state administration would immediately "wither away" with the revolution of 1917.¹¹ It would take time while all the masses of workers were educated in the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. The primary consideration for Lenin was to fit the Marxist philosophy to the peculiar Russian situation.

Variances From Marxism

There has been a great deal of controversy about the issue of Lenin's interpretation of Marx. Lenin varied from the strict Marxian doctrine, both by re-interpretation and extension of the philosophy. This resulted in the political doctrine known as Leninism. Some of the major variances will be discussed here.

Sequence of Revolution

Fainsod discussed the feud Lenin and Plekhanov -- the father of Russian Marxism -- carried on concerning the two-stage sequence of revolution professed by Marx.¹²

Plekhanov, the theorist, was to remain loyal to this formulation [two-stage revolution] for the rest of his life. Lenin, the activist, was to find it increasingly uncongenial and, though he continued for many years to pay it verbal tribute, his whole revolutionary career was essentially an escape from its confines.¹³

Lenin repeatedly proclaimed Marxism was simply a guide of action, a flexible philosophy to be applied to the practical political situation. Meyer feels "Lenin's strategy in those early years was clearly an attempt to make Russia fit the Marxist scheme."¹⁴ To achieve these ends, Lenin had to first justify why the revolution should break out in Russia -- as opposed to the highly industrialized Germany -- and why it was unnecessary to follow the Marxian sequence of the bourgeois democratic revolution and then the proletariat uprising. He succeeded in his work, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.

Basically, Lenin attempted to answer the question why revolution had not broken out in the more industrialized countries. The escape route for capitalism was "expansion into the whole world in search of cheap raw materials, ready markets for commodities and for excess capital, and most important, cheap labor which could be exploited in unprecedented measure."¹⁵ Strict Marxists who criticized Lenin for reinterpreting Marx were met with the argument that Marx could not have been aware of the highest form of capitalism -- imperialism -- because it occurred after his death. Therefore, argued Lenin, imperialism was simply capitalism on a world-scale and consequently, revolution would break out in the weakest link of the capitalist chain. This was Russia. Thus in this writing, Lenin not only was able to dismiss the historical contradictions that occurred with traditional Marxian teachings but was

able to jump a step in the sequence of revolution and finally justify a socialist revolution developing in Russia.

Proletarian Question

As has been noted elsewhere, Marx felt capitalism would be crushed by the proletariat, or working class. They would not be led or educated in the inequality of capitalism. Simply by experiencing the alienation working class society brings, they would desire the overthrow of capitalism.

... the working class, by merely following its instincts, would gain rational insight and engage in rational action; in which historical forces working themselves out spontaneously and in a determined course would bring about the progress and salvation of mankind.¹⁶

Lenin, however, was not as optimistic about the ability of the working class to carry out a revolution.

The spontaneous development of the working-class movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology, ... for the spontaneous working-class movement is trade-unionism, ... and trade unionism means the ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie.¹⁷

Lenin felt the workers would settle for "tokenism" -- whereby the bourgeoisie provide better housing, working conditions, wages and shorter work days -- rather than becoming educated in the historical roots and goals of Marxism.

Leadership Elite

To this end Lenin established a set of rules for all members of the Communist Party. In the early days of the Party, before the overthrow of the tsarist regime, these rules were unique because they

emphasized:

- a) Secret organizational structure of a highly-disciplined military nature;
 - b) Organization geared towards legal as well as illegal activity;
 - c) Strict rules for membership, i.e. those who were committed to Marxism-Leninism and literally willing to die for the cause.¹⁸
- Following the revolution, Lenin saw the prime occupation of the professional worker as one which involved the education of the masses. This was essential if the Bolsheviks were to remain in power. "The secret of its strength would lie in the fact that the party was to act as an organization through which consciousness could get hold of the masses."¹⁹

The Mensheviks, at the Second Congress of 1903, considering themselves the strict Marxian theorists, violently argued Lenin was wrong. The proletariat would develop political awareness instinctively and anyone who desired the overthrow of the tsarist regime should be considered a communist or Party member. Lenin satirically criticized Martov, the Menshevik leader, viewing his attitude as "tailism"²⁰ and as creating a vague distinction between Party and non-Party members. "Its harm is that it introduces a disorganizing idea, the confusing of class and party."²¹ Lenin needed a strongly organized party, for despite his predictions, the proletarian revolution in Russia did not set off a chain of worker revolts in other countries. The Russian Bolsheviks were on their own and had to retain power. They achieved this through any means possible, coercive or peaceful. Lenin stated:

The habits of the capitalist system are too strong; to reeducate the people who have been brought up to these habits for centuries is no easy matter and will take a long time. But

we say that our fighting weapon is organisation. We must organise everything, take everything into our own hands, keep a check on the kulaks and profiteers at every step, declare implacable war on them and never allow them to breathe freely, controlling their every move.²²

This could not be achieved without

... the most rigorous and truly iron discipline in our Party, or without the fullest and unreserved support from the entire mass of the working class, that is, from all thinking, honest, devoted and influential elements in it, capable of leading the backward strata or carrying the latter along with them.²³

The above methods kept the Bolsheviks in power immediately following the revolution. This was due, in a large part, to the powerful organizational structure of the Party. Although greatly outnumbered by more conservative socialists and capitalists, Lenin was the only leader willing to attempt the reconstruction of the Soviet Union, following the First World War, civil war, general famine, disorder and unrest. Lenin was not only interested in retaining power but increasing it. This was to be accomplished by the dictatorship of the proletariat, using any and all means at their disposal.

The dictatorship of the proletariat means a most determined and most ruthless war waged by the new class against a more powerful enemy, the bourgeoisie, whose resistance is increased tenfold by their overthrow..., the dictatorship of the proletariat [is] necessary, and victory over the bourgeoisie is impossible without a long, stubborn and desperate life-and-death struggle which calls for tenacity, discipline, and a single and inflexible will.²⁴

The successful struggle would educate the mass of workers in the "truth" to be learned from Marxism. For those who could not, or would not be educated, coercion would be used. Under no circumstances would capitalism be allowed to flourish. All peasants, small business men,

officials and intellectuals would be subordinated to the proletarian state and leadership.

Democratic Centralism

The fourth major variance from Marxism follows directly from the establishment of a strongly organized party. This is the policy of democratic centralism.

The guiding principle of the organizational structure of the Party is democratic centralism, which signifies:

- (A) election of all leading Party bodies, from the lowest to the highest;
- (B) periodic reports of Party bodies to their Party organizations and to higher bodies;
- (C) strict Party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority;
- (D) that the decisions of higher bodies are obligatory for lower bodies.²⁵

Lenin felt a party that was centrally directed in a coordinated fashion was the secret of success for revolutionary parties. It produced organization of the highest degree. As Meyer said, "organization to him [Lenin], not only meant strength, ... it also meant rationality."²⁶

From this original premise, Lenin logically concluded that:

... the party, as organized consciousness, consciousness as a decision-making machinery, [has] superior reasoning power. Indeed in time this collective body [takes] on an aura of infallibility, ...²⁷

Today the implementation of the Party policy carries this argument to the extreme. Not only has the Party taken on an aura of infallibility but this infallibility has become dogma. It is a test of a true communist to admit the Party is never wrong and any failings in Party policy are due to individual errors.

Peasant Problem

The final variance from Marxism is in regards to the peasants. Marx had little to say about the peasants except that as agriculture became more and more industrialized, the peasants would be assimilated into the proletarian class. Lenin, however, viewed the peasants as a potential revolutionary class in themselves, siding with the proletariat. Since they had fought against tsarist officials concerning land and serfdom, they were, as far as Lenin was concerned, a revolutionary force on the side of socialism.

The above variances have produced a political doctrine known as Leninism. Along with the philosophy of dialectical materialism of Marx, one arrives at the political philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. Experts in the political science field see Marx as the philosopher and Lenin as the politician who successfully implemented the philosophy.

Stalinism

Whereas Lenin set the groundwork for an authoritarian, proletarian dictatorship, Stalin demonstrated how far the authoritarian dictatorship could be carried. He augmented greater and greater control in the hands of the General Secretary and Politburo until he was absolute dictator. In his book, The Foundations of Leninism, Stalin made it quite clear what was expected of the Party members and the masses.

Opportunism

Stalin defined opportunism in terms of spontaneity. He contended it was

... a theory of worshipping the spontaneity of the labour movement, ... it is in favour of the movement proceeding exclusively along the line of "realisable" demands, of demands "acceptable" to capitalism; it is wholly in favour of the "line of least resistance." The theory of worshipping spontaneity is decidedly opposed to giving the spontaneous movement a politically conscious planned character.²⁸

Anyone guilty of opportunism, which has come to mean anyone out of favour with the General Secretary, was to be purged from the Party. Stalin's early statement rings ominously when considering the era of the purges.

... [The] ruthless struggle against such elements [opportunists], their expulsion from the Party, is a prerequisite for the successful struggle against imperialism. ... Proletarian parties develop and become strong by purging themselves of opportunists and reformists, social-imperialists and social-chauvinists, social-patriots and social-pacifists.²⁹

Dictatorship of the Proletariat

The revolution had as its tool the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was the organ by which resistance of the tsarist regime was crushed and the Party consolidated its achievements. Its main purpose under CPSU leaders is the advancement of the Soviet Union towards communism. Lenin emphasized and Stalin reiterated the importance of the dictatorship.

... the revolution will be unable to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie, to maintain its victory and to push forward to the final victory of socialism unless, at a certain stage in its development, it creates a special organ in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat as its principal mainstay.³⁰

The Party is not only the highest form of class association of the proletarians, it is at the same time, an instrument in the hands of the proletariat for achieving the dictatorship when that has not yet been achieved and for consolidating and expanding the dictatorship when it has been achieved.³¹

Single Party Rule

Stalin differentiated between capitalist democracy and proletarian democracy in the following way. Capitalist democracy was democracy whereby the bourgeoisie exploit the majority and restrict their rights. Proletarian democracy is the exact opposite of this, that is, the majority restrict and suppress the rights of the minority.

Since the Communist Party is the organ of proletarian dictatorship, its leaders can unite the oppressed majority. By introducing political cells into the factory, armed forces, anywhere people meet, the Party can "completely exercise its political leadership of the mass struggle."³² What this all means is that there is no need of any other party. In the future the state will no longer be necessary. As Marxism-Leninism is synonymous with truth, all that is needed is education of the oppressed majority. This occurs in the industrial units where people learn the evolution of historical dialectical materialism. Opposition is considered opportunism and is dealt with, as mentioned above.

Justification of Supreme Rule

Lenin emphatically stated there must be democratic centralism. Lower bodies would follow the directives of higher organs. For Stalin, this meant he could exercise considerable control over the Party. Any criticism against his administration amounted to opportunism and was quickly and ruthlessly crushed. "The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot afford to be liberal or to permit freedom of factions."³³

Leadership After Stalin

With Khrushchev's denouncement of Stalin's methods of rule, the leaders that followed him have had to be wary of how they exercise their control. It can be safely said the head of the Party wields a great deal of power. Lenin designed the Party with this fact in mind. He himself wanted control, because he felt his knowledge of Marxism was more correct and greater than any other revolutionary leader. It was under Stalin that this absolute control was carried to its extreme. There has been a trend towards greater responsibility of lower organs and decentralization in recent years. The greatest authority remains with the General Secretary and Politburo however.

Summary

In summary, one can see Lenin laid the groundwork for the strong organizational apparatus which characterizes the contemporary Bolshevik, or Communist, Party. His pessimism about the masses being able to carry out the revolution led him to plan a powerful iron-disciplined vanguard to lead the Soviet people toward communism. Any criticism of Party policy was considered opportunism and was quickly crushed. Those members of society who could not be educated in "proper socialist behavior" were either coerced, exiled, or killed. Party members were supposed to be the epitome of the "New Socialist Man" and frequent purges deterred the would-be opportunist. Higher organ policies were to be carried out without hesitation by lower bodies, the process being defined as democratic centralism. The logic of this policy was carried to such an

extreme that today the Party is thought to be infallible and there is only individual, not organizational, failure.

Stalin reiterated what Lenin had said, establishing the now famous dictatorship of the Party. The apparatus allows the individual leader of the Party ease of handling and the highest efficiency in organization. It also allows him to impose his individual personality upon the Party. As will be seen later, the CPSU is unique as a political party for its organizational ability, its control and influence upon many non-political fields of life, particularly sport. First however, the Party and governmental organizational structure will be discussed. The Party apparatus forms the basis for organizing Soviet sport. The Party is also organized in such a way the CPSU General Secretary can retain his power by keeping trusted members in positions of authority. This power also influences the Supreme Soviet and the government of the Soviet Union. The influence on these bodies will be discussed now.

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- ¹⁴ Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 236.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., p. 241.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., p. 25.
- ¹⁷ V.I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?, in Collected Works, Vol. V, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), p. 384.

¹⁸For a complete description of Party Rules see I. Pronin and M. Stepichev, Leninist Standards of Party Life, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969).

¹⁹Meyer, op. cit., p. 52.

²⁰Khvostism or tailism is Lenin's description of the opportunists, those revolutionaries who would follow the trends rather than lead and establish the trend. The analogy is to a dog's tail wagging, rather than the dog's head leading, the rest of the body.

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²²V.I. Lenin, Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in Collected Works, Vol. XXVII, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), pp. 517-518.

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²⁵Jan F. Triska, ed. Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 168-169.

²⁶Meyer, op. cit., p. 97.

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²⁹Ibid., pp. 116-117.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE ORGANIZATIONAL APPARATUS

With the Bolshevik victory in 1917, Lenin had major changes to make in the long-range goals of the Party. He firmly believed the proletarian dictatorship, then in power, provided the transitional link between the defeated capitalists and the newly emerging communist society. As mentioned before, Lenin did not really believe the non-Party masses could govern themselves. They would have to be led. This leadership was to be provided by the Party.

Leadership is essential, and it must be a special kind of leadership. It must guide the people toward a specific goal, not in response to their present wishes but by molding them so that their wishes coincide with those of the leaders.¹

Therefore the Party from its very beginning was "a creature of its high command."²

Origins of the Apparatus

Pre-Revolutionary Party

The early Bolsheviks were not a party in themselves but a faction of the Social Democratic Party. Only after gaining power in 1917 did they split from the Social Democrats and form their own Party. These early Party members can be divided into two distinct groups. Firstly, there were the intellectuals who spent the majority of pre-revolutionary time in exile. Here they wrote, debated and created socialist doctrine. The second group is characterized by the more practical minded underground worker. These people remained in Russia fighting the tsarist

regime both legally and illegally. This faction was the well-disciplined, organized group that epitomized Lenin's Party worker. Their prime aim and responsibility was the destruction and overthrow of tsarist society. When this was accomplished in 1917, Lenin faced a momentous task. He had to channel this destructive force into a constructive rebuilding apparatus. Although new members joined the Party after the revolution Lenin was intent upon having the old Bolsheviks in places of authority. Old Bolsheviks would be less likely to use the Party as a means of realizing individual goals. This was not always the case of the careerists who joined the Party after the revolution.

Party in Power

One of the overriding problems faced by the Communists³ was the lack of cohesion and organization of the Party members. Here was a group near the bottom of the social scale under the tsars who suddenly found the situation reversed. Without adequate direction from the higher organs, local Party committees took decisions into their own hands. They seized plants and factories and set up management boards to run the particular industry. Often these management boards lacked the technical expertise to operate the industry efficiently. This fact played a role when Lenin decided in favour of the New Economic Policy, one aspect of which was the retention of the old state bureaucracy for administering Party policy.

The bureaucrats retained their old tsarist positions and ran the governmental apparatus. Lenin maintained power of the apparatus by assigning Party members to the local units (soviets) of government.

Technically capable tsarist managers were also placed in positions of authority in Soviet industry. Bolsheviks were assigned to plants and factories to gain the experience necessary to succeed the tsarist managers. Needless to say, this period produced much confusion and inefficiency.

Because the Bolsheviks worked through the governmental apparatus, the Party organization began to lose some of its effect. This problem was dealt with at the Seventh Party Congress in March 1918. Iakov Sverdlov, the secretary of the Party Central Committee (CC) proposed the Party should be better organized and have greater responsibility for functions previously in the hands of the government. The outbreak of the Civil War shelved Sverdlov's proposal.

The Party in its initial days of power was inefficient and poorly organized. It was workable because Sverdlov was both the Secretary of the CC and Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Congress of Soviets. Fainsod gives some insight into the workings of Sverdlov:

From early 1917 until early 1919, central responsibility was concentrated largely in the hands of Sverdlov, veteran committeeman of prerevolutionary days, whose rich and varied experience in the underground gave him a wide acquaintance among the committeemen. ...[He] functioned largely without staff, and the only complete record of his transactions was in his head. When he suddenly died on the eve of the Eighth Congress in March 1919, the Party found itself in the embarrassing position of mourning the loss of its record office and central secretarial apparatus as well as a respected member of the Central Committee.⁴

With Sverdlov's death the Eighth Party Congress proposed a resolution on organization. The Party committees were to guide and control the government and industrial apparatus but leave all administration

to the soviets and tsarist managerial elite.

To aid the Party organization, Krestinskii was appointed to succeed Sverdlov. He was given a properly organized staff grouped into departments. The CC was given Party control according to the principle of democratic centralism. The Congress also abolished the local Party committee's dependence on the soviets for finances. The Party's control increased rapidly because of the resolution. So much so, in March 1922, some responsibility of a purely soviet character was given back to the local governmental bodies.

The Party apparatus that resulted from the March 1919 resolution can now be examined.

Higher Party Apparatus

The concept of democratic centralism pervades the Soviet apparatus. As cited earlier, democratic centralism involved the election of all Party bodies, from lowest to highest; periodic reports of Party bodies to their Party organizations and to higher bodies; strict Party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority; and the obligatory nature of all decisions of higher bodies on lower bodies.

Party democracy consisted of the free election of delegates to congresses, followed by the election of a party central committee by each congress. In this way different views represented by individuals or groups would find expression; and at the congresses as well as in the central committee, policy would be fully discussed and thrashed out before a vote was taken. Once decided, however, it could no longer be challenged. Everyone was bound to obey the decisions whether he had supported or opposed them at the time or did so now.⁵

The CC then appointed a Secretariat to run the affairs of the Party and

an executive committee -- Politburo -- to oversee the total operation. This provided the essentials of Party democracy. The Secretariat, under the auspices of the CC, was to produce policy binding on all lower Party organs. There are other points of democratic centralism but the most important one is the binding decision of higher Party bodies on lower bodies. In reality, the democratic nature of the Party is overstated. The leader of the Party is firmly entrenched in the executive committee. His most trusted colleagues are part of this body, and hold down as well, the most influential positions in the CC. The Congress unanimously elects any member previously "recommended" by the leaders. Thus, in practice, the emphasis is on the "centralism" of democratic centralism. No real authority is established in lower bodies. The decisions are all made at higher levels with little or no discussion except among the top Party leaders.

Politburo

The Politburo is a living example of the secret organization that characterized the early prerevolutionary Party. Even today the Politburo is very secretive and the task of discovering specific duties of this body is a momentous one. But, as Fainsod says:

Its manifest importance as the center of initiative for Soviet Communism makes the closest study of its composition, its actions and its outlook a matter of imperative concern.⁶

The executive body was first established during the early days of 1917. It was established to provide political leadership for the masses and committeemen during the revolution. After Lenin came to power it was

abolished. At this period of Party rule, the CC was the dominant factor in the Soviet Union.

During the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, the CC again introduced the executive body to the apparatus. At this time three new organs were created which continued to play the most important role in the Soviet Union. These were the Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat.

The Politburo was to decide all matters that required immediate action. It consisted of five members of the Central Committee, the first being Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Kamenev and Krestinskii. To guarantee the CC would not lose any of its authority, all CC members were allowed to attend Politburo meetings, to consult with its members and enter into discussions. They had no voting privileges however. Each year the Politburo was authorized to submit a report of its proceedings to the CC.

The Orgburo was also made up of five appointed CC members. Its duties consisted of the organizational work of the Party. Thus it was involved in the practical day-to-day operations of the organizational apparatus. It met three times a week and presented bi-weekly reports to the CC. Stalin, who was also a member of the Orgburo, used this body to his advantage when he took power.

Initially the only member of both the Politburo and Orgburo was Stalin. The other members of the Politburo took no part in the intra-Party management or practical work. "The typical procedure of the Politburo involved discussion and action based on a report by the agency charged with initial responsibility in the given field."⁷

The two bodies remained separate and distinct until 1952 at which

time the Nineteenth Party Congress voted to combine them so as to form the Presidium.

It is expedient to transform the Politburo into a Presidium of the Party Central Committee, organized to direct the work of the Central Committee between plenary sessions since the title Presidium better accords with the functions which the Politburo actually performs at the present time. As regards the current organizational work of the Central Committee, as practice has shown, it is expedient to concentrate this work in one body, the Secretariat, in which connection there is to be no Orgburo of the Central Committee in the future.⁸

Today the Politburo⁹ is the top policy-making and coordinating body of the Soviet Union. It is in the Politburo meetings where the long and short-range plans are discussed, where political and economic emphases are established and where budget allocations are formulated.

The duties of the Politburo, as outlined in the Party Rules, include responsibility of the work of the CC when it is not in session. Since the CC meets at varying intervals, decisions are often made by the Politburo, sitting in permanent session. The power of the Politburo is such that "Central Committee resolutions usually reflect Politburo decisions, and the Politburo also issues directives to various government ministries and agencies."¹⁰

It is usual that the leader of the Communist Party, its General Secretary, is the leading member of the Politburo. Other members include the head of the Supreme Soviet, the chief of state, several CC secretaries and deputy premiers. Often the individual members have a specific area of responsibility in the Soviet economy which they handle. Information regarding the implementation of Politburo policy and decisions is filtered up through the apparatus to the Secretariat. Here

the information is arranged into an agenda. Lesser issues are solved by the Secretariat and problems that concern only one member of the Politburo are often dealt with directly by that member. Only the most important decisions are discussed and solved in the Politburo.

Central Committee

The CC is the oldest organ of the higher Party apparatus. It originated at the First Congress in 1898 when three of the nine delegates to the congress were elected. In theory, members of the CC were to be elected by a long process beginning at the primary organ, the Party cell. In reality the Committee consists of people who are recommended by the Politburo. These candidates are unanimously elected by delegates at Party Congresses. Not only do the candidates include Party secretaries and state functionaries but members of the military and foreign service, Party ideologists, intellectuals and scientists. It is in the best interests of the General Secretary to have trusted, reliable men in the Central body.

The CC loses much of its potential power by its very size alone. At the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in 1971, it was enlarged from 360 to 390 -- 241 full members and 155 candidate members as compared with 195 and 165, respectively, elected in 1966. Membership in the CC is primarily a prestige and status honour. As Nemzer says:

The Party itself, and the organizations subordinate to it, are in theory directed by the Party's Central Committee, but the latter's powers have in reality been taken over by [the Politburo].¹¹

Members come from all republics of the Soviet Union and have individual

administrative duties that take up much of their time. The lack of time available means responsibilities of the Committee cannot be dealt with on a day-to-day basis. Since CC members cannot meet frequently enough to handle the responsibilities, their duties have been given, to a large extent, to the Secretariat of the Party. For this reason, Fainsod has said:

The flood of decrees which issue in the name of the Central Committee are actually prepared by its Secretariat subject to the immediate direction of the Central Committee secretaries and the policy guidance of the [Politburo] itself.¹²

Secretariat

The Secretariat was the organ developed at the Eighth Congress, along with the Politburo and Orgburo. At this time it had no definite duties because its first secretary, Krestinskii was more interested in political matters than practical administration. Originally it consisted of one responsible secretary and five technical secretaries. Stalin took over the First Secretary position in April, 1922 thus becoming a member of all four leading Party bodies -- CC, Politburo, Orgburo, Secretariat. He made the Secretariat one of the most powerful of the Party bodies. At the Ninth Congress the Secretariat duties were given in rather vague terms. It was to deal with current questions of administration and those of an executive nature. With Stalin's influence, in 1922,

Its functions expanded to include the mobilization and allocation of Party personnel, the supervision of regional and local Party organizations through a corps of responsible instructors, and the guidance of propaganda and agitation activities. In addition, special sections were established to direct Party work in the villages, among women, and among the national minorities.¹³

With the increased power and staff, the Secretariat soon became an important bureaucratic apparatus. The top secretaries all were appointed by the leadership of the Party. The Party apparatus thus became "a homogeneous, disciplined, and highly controlled machine."¹⁴

This brief discussion indicates the administrative power and control the Party had gained since 1917. Upon first gaining power, the Party worked primarily through the Soviets in exerting influence. When it was realized the Party apparatus was suffering because of this, resolutions were passed to strengthen Party control. It was organized more efficiently with the power centered in the higher Party apparatus.

Congresses were to elect a CC to handle the administration of the Party. The infrequency with which congresses were called relegated much of this authority to the Secretariat. Under Stalin, the Secretariat became the top administrative body of the Party. Today the Secretariat is organized in such a way that every major sector of life in the Soviet Union is paralleled by a corresponding Secretariat branch.

Sports are organized under the Union of Sports Societies and Organizations of the USSR (USSO). This organization jointly decides questions of development of physical culture and sport with several ministries of the Council of Ministers. These bodies are guided in their decision-making by a Party department of the All-Union apparatus. For example, USSO and the Ministry of Education decide the development of physical culture and sport in schools. The Central Committee Secretariat, the Department of Science and Educational Institutions, is the guiding Party organ.

"Nomenklatura"

Leadership policies were put into effect by controlling the Party administration from the higher apparatus. But policies are useless unless implemented. The Party ensures this will happen through its nomenklatura, handled by the Cadres Department of the Secretariat. Whereas the higher Party appointments were made by the Politburo and CC, the lower Party appointments -- to the Oblast (province, region, district) level -- were the responsibility of the Cadres Department.

The term "nomenklatura" literally means nothing more than "nomenclature": it is a list of positions arranged in order of seniority, including a description of the duties of each office. Its political importance comes from the fact that the party's nomenklatura -- and it alone -- contains the most important leading positions in all organized activities of social life. Other intermediate positions are contained in institutional nomenklatura, but these are subject to supervision, if not specific approval, by the party.¹⁵

Initially, the Cadres Department recommended a person for a particular position. With this recommendation, the candidate was assured of appointment.

Available information indicates that most responsible workers in the Apparatus have served an apprenticeship at lower levels of Communist Party organization, usually within the provincial or district organs. The major characteristic desired in such workers appears to be trustworthiness, rather than technical training...¹⁶

Through the Cadres Department, the Party leadership could be certain trusted and reliable people were in key positions both in the Party and non-Party organizations.¹⁷

The Cadres Department of 1939 replaced Uchraspred (Account and Assignment Section) of 1920. Uchraspred was developed for two reasons.

Firstly, with the organizational resolution of the Eighth Party Congress of 1919, the Party apparatus had to be re-built and organized. Secondly, only a minority of the population belonged to the Party. Therefore membership brought with it the responsibility of being "summoned when needed and assigned wherever their [Party members] services were required."¹⁸ This massive organizational function was the responsibility of Uchraspred.

After the Civil War this method of allocating responsibility was abolished as inefficient. It became important to train technical and politically sound individuals and delegate authority for fulfilling Party plans. Individuals that characterized the Party "ideal" were recommended to fill vacant positions. These recommendations were always unanimously accepted. By 1923 Uchraspred was not only involved in filling Party positions but "it was expanding its jurisdiction into the state apparatus and controlling appointments to important administrative and economic posts."¹⁹

In 1924 Uchraspred gave way to Orgraspred, a combination of Uchraspred and the Organization-Instruction Section.

The Orgraspred functioned as the cadre office of the Stalin-machine. Its responsibilities were wide-ranging. It made recommendations for appointments, promotions, and transfers not only to Party offices but also to important positions in the commissariats, the trade-union bureaucracy, industry and the cooperative network. It maintained dossiers on leading Party workers and controlled their assignments. It prepared directives on all questions relating to Party structure and organization. Through a corps of responsible instructors, it supervised the activities of local Party organizations directly, received and analyzed their reports, participated in their meetings, arranged conferences of secretaries and other Party functionaries, transmitted advice and instructions to them, and, where necessary, arranged for changes in leadership.²⁰

Today the Secretariat at each level of the Party pyramid is responsible for the nomenklatura. Increased delegation of authority has allowed each section or department of the Secretariat to be responsible for the nomenklatura in the area of the economy of social organization with which it specializes. "Each department manages a nomenklatura for the appropriate sector of organized life but below the All-Union level."²¹

Appointments to the All-Union Secretariat and departments are made by the CPSU Central Committee. The CC choices are dictated by the Politburo and General Secretary of the Party.

The essential point of the nomenklatura system is that people are not promoted for technical or intellectual excellence solely but also on their political reliability.²² Party reliability involves following the doctrine and procedures of the CPSU because it contains the truth, proclaiming unquestioned identification with Party goals and self-subordination to Party directives. With the ability to authorize all positions, the Party consolidated its hold on Soviet society. Today, as in Stalin's day, "Cadres decide everything."²³

Lower Party Apparatus

The lower Party apparatus is a mirror image of the All-Union one. The principle of democratic centralism does not delegate a great deal of authority to these lower bodies. Since all major decisions are decided at the All-Union level, lower bodies supervise and mobilize personnel for carrying out Party decisions. They are responsible for work

of a local concern but anything of major importance is handled at a higher level.

Figure one gives the schematic structure of the CPSU apparatus. The basic Party pyramid, developing from a mass base upwards to the most important organs, is used as a model in other sectors of the Soviet Union. Sports are organized using the same principle, as will be seen later.

Primary Party Organization

The mass base is the primary Party organization. They are formed in every Soviet enterprise and institution, including those of sport. Wherever three Communist members are employed, a primary unit is created. By this means, the Party can both influence and observe the behavior of non-Party citizens. "The primary Party organization," Reshetar says, "serves as the eyes and ears of the Party in every enterprise, institution, or public organization."²⁴

District Level

The second organizational unit above the primary Party organization is the raikom or gorkom. The raikom is the Party committee responsible for the district (raion) while the gorkom is the corresponding committee at the municipal or city (gorod) level.


Provincial Level

At the provincial level are the obkom and kraikom committees. The obkom is the committee organized for the province (oblast) while the kraikom is the territorial (krai) Party committee.

Republic Level

Every non-Russian republic has a Republic Central Committee similar to the All-Union one. In the smaller republics, not divided into provinces, the Republic Central Committee is treated as an obkom committee. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) has no Republic Central Committee but is directed from the All-Union CC in Moscow.

The significance of the CPSU organizational apparatus -- as diagrammed in Figure one -- is the amount of control it allows the All-Union organs. Because of democratic centralism, the lower Party organs are obligated to carry out policies settled at the All-Union congresses. Since the Secretariat can place Party members in positions of authority -- via the nomenklatura -- and since the Politburo controls the appointments to the Secretariat -- also via the nomenklatura --, the leaders of the CPSU are assured the power base will remain in the hands of the Politburo and its members.



Governmental Apparatus

The Party does not end its authority with the centralized control of its apparatus. It also consolidates its position by supervising the government apparatus. By controlling the activities of the government, the CPSU can also control sectors of Soviet society generally considered non-political. The government apparatus gives the Party the legal authority it would not otherwise have. The Party has also imposed its organizational principles and structure on the government. (See Figure two).

The centralism that characterizes Communist Party organization has thus been extended to the government, and the lower soviets are "strictly subordinate" to the higher soviets. At the same time, all soviets, including the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, are in fact subordinate to the Communist Party organization at each jurisdictional level.²⁵

Although the Party control is apparent in practice, in theory the Soviet Union has one of the most democratic constitutions in the world. The 1936 Constitution was written with this express purpose in mind. Stalin was worried about war with Nazi Germany and could not afford to antagonize the Allies from whom help might later be required. Therefore he drafted the constitution in hopes of showing the western nations the Soviet Union was headed towards more moderate democratic trends. Despite this constitution, the Party dominates, staffing not only the Party apparatus but the government with members who are both technically qualified and sympathetic to Party causes. As Fainsod expresses it, the western notion of constitutionalism is alien to the Soviet Union.




FIGURE TWO: STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENTAL APPARATUS. [ADAPTED FROM JOHN N. HAZARD, THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT (4TH ED., REVISED, CHICAGO: THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 1968) P. 217]

Its [Soviet Union] ruling party is self-perpetuating, and it cannot be dislodged save by revolution. Its powers are all-embracing and without limit. So-called "constitutional" arrangements derive such force as they possess from the regime's sanction; the whole apparatus of government and administration is subject to its dictates. The leadership enforces a standard of orthodoxy from which there can be no dissent. Opposition is outlawed and invested with the stamp of treason. Citizens have duties and obligations; such rights as they exercise depend on the precarious beneficence of the ruling group. Freedom is equated with obedience. Individual values must conform to the system of values prescribed by the top leadership. Men seek fulfillment in serving a power which they dare not defy.²⁶

Observations of the Supreme Soviet apparatus, its functions and membership will indicate its lack of authority and the Party-imposed influence.

Supreme Soviet

The Supreme Soviet is in constitutional theory the highest governmental body in the Soviet Union. This description is appropriate only to the extent that the Supreme Soviet approves the basic laws of government of the Soviet Union. Its lack of power and authority is readily apparent when the amount of time it sits in session is calculated. Reshetar estimates "it meets for but a few days each year -- usually eight or ten days at most."²⁷ It is ludicrous to assume a country as vast as the Soviet Union can fulfill all government business in less than two weeks. The rapidity with which the Supreme Soviet can cover its yearly agenda is partly due to the system of voting. Delegates vote by a show of hands only and have never vetoed any proposal put to the vote -- in fact they unanimously approve every act of legislation. According to Reshetar this is because the Supreme Soviet operates under

close scrutiny of the CPSU Central Committee.²⁸

Not only does the CPSU exert control over the Supreme Soviet through the CC but also by the election of Party members to the government.

In 1966 the percentage of Communist party members and candidates among the deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. was 75.7 in one chamber and 74.6 in the other.²⁹

The remainder of deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet, although not Party members, are sympathetic to the Party's cause. Because of this influence, the CPSU is assured its policies will be approved and more importantly, given legal strength.³⁰ Party leaders have a further advantage over the high Supreme Soviet officials -- President, Vice Presidents, Ministers -- in that they are not accountable to the government in any way. Government officials are held responsible to the Supreme Soviet apparatus.

Presidium

Similar to the position of the Politburo in the CPSU apparatus, the Presidium assumes power when the Supreme Soviet is not in session. "Although in theory the Presidium is accountable to the Supreme Soviet, in practice it exercises independent powers much of the time."³¹ Party influence extends to the Presidium as well as the Supreme Soviet. The General Secretary as well as several Party members or candidate members are members of the Presidium.³²

Council of Ministers

Article 56 of the Constitution equates the government of the Soviet

Union with the Council of Ministers. Although appointed by the Supreme Soviet, it is likely all leading personnel in the Council of Ministers have been previously selected through the Party nomenklatura.³³ Thus "Ministers are generally members of the Central Committee of the Party and are usually deputies of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet."³⁴

The Council of Ministers is involved in the administration of the Party plan, coordinating and directing the work of the All-Union and Union-Republic Ministers, as well as all apparatus and organizations under its jurisdiction. If the Council cannot fulfill Party directives without breaking the law, the law is amended by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. As a result the laws are constantly amended, the changes appearing in the Supreme Soviet publication, Vedomosti.

Besides retaining power of the Council of Ministers by appointing Party members to the Council, the CPSU Secretariat can also act in a supervisory capacity. For every area of ministerial activity there is a corresponding body in the Party Secretariat. Armstrong feels the Secretariat position is one "to oversee, stimulate, and check the administrative state economic agencies."³⁵ For example, the Secretariat Department of Defence Industry is the policy-deciding body. The Ministries of Defence Industry and Medium Machine Building are two of the several line agencies that implement the policy.

Lower State Apparatus

The lower state apparatus -- republic, autonomous region, areas, districts, cities, rural localities -- as previously mentioned operate according to the principle of democratic centralism. As well, article

19 of the Constitution binds the laws of the USSR on the union republics.

Party control is exerted on the Supreme Soviet, which establishes laws. Consequently Party control is indirectly imposed on the lower state apparatus. Further, the government apparatus is subordinate to the CPSU at each level of government.

Other Party Controls

As well as placing trusted communists in positions of authority, the Party has other methods of control. In industry the primary Party organization ensures the CPSU that its policies are being carried out in the most efficient manner. Technical managers are advised of the proper means of fulfilling the industry's objectives. This has caused a good deal of conflict between the technical and political managers. In sports clubs, the political manager complains about the lack of indoctrination and the over-emphasis on physical improvement at the neglect of political improvement. The same situation occurs in the economic sector of Soviet life.

CPSU leaders appear content to follow the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress as a "guiding" organ. Any shortcomings discovered by primary Party organizations are referred to the higher apparatus, which informs the appropriate government control agency.³⁶ Thus, although the Party is in complete control, it creates the illusion the Supreme Soviet is the authority in the country.

Summary

The principle points to be remembered when dealing with the organizational apparatus are three-fold. Firstly, the Party as the "leading vanguard of the working people" does not allow any opposition to its central control. It infiltrates all facets of Soviet life. As Khrushchev said:

The Party is responsible for everything. Whether it is Army work, Chekist [now KGB] work, economic work, Soviet work -- all is subordinate to the Party leadership, and if anyone thinks otherwise, that means he is no Bolshevik.³⁷

Party control of all important positions and organizations is paramount in Soviet society. The Party assures its control by placing -- directly or indirectly through government elections -- trusted communists in positions of authority through its nomenklatura system.

Secondly, the concept of democratic centralism with its binding influence on lower Party and state organs directly influences the decisions and amount of spontaneous action the Party Politburo will allow. Thirdly, the governmental apparatus operates on concepts different from those of western democracies. In the Soviet Union the Party develops the policy, long and short-range goals and methods of achieving these aims. The Council of Ministers implements this policy, administering the state according to the Plan. The Supreme Soviet approves all acts of government, giving them a legal basis they would otherwise not have.

Khrushchev's statement about everything being subordinate to the Party extends further than the state apparatus. The brief sketch of the Party and government illustrates the extent of control the Party

exerts, both on the lower Party organs and the government. This control carries over to areas of Soviet society normally considered non-political. In Chapter three, the Party influence in the field of sport will be discussed.

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²Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled, (revised ed. enlarged, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 387.

³The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the name adopted by the Bolsheviks after acquiring power.

⁴Fainsod, op. cit., p. 178.

⁵J.P. Nettl, The Soviet Achievement, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967), p. 23.

⁶Fainsod, op. cit., p. 307.

⁷Ibid., p. 309.

⁸Pravda, August 26, 1952, translated and quoted in Fainsod, op. cit., p. 323.

⁹Under Lenin the term Politburo was used. Stalin had the term changed to Presidium. It remained as such until 1966 when it again took up the term Politburo.

¹⁰John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity: Government and Politics in the U.S.S.R., (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1971), p. 143.

¹¹Figures of CC composition found in Leonard Schapiro, "Keynote - Compromise", Problems of Communism, XX (July-August, 1971), p. 6.

Louis Nemzer, "The Kremlin's Professional Staff: The Apparatus of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union," Political Science Review, XLIV (March, 1950), p. 64.

¹²Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 218-219.

¹³Ibid., pp. 180-181.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Bohdan Harasymiw, "Nomenklatura: The Soviet Communist Party's Leadership Recruitment System," Canadian Journal of Political Science, II (December, 1969), p. 494.

¹⁶Nemzer, op. cit., p. 85.

¹⁷This makes the Secretary of the Cadres Department a very important person. It is not uncommon for this position to be the first filled when a new leader takes control.

¹⁸Fainsod, op. cit., p. 182.

¹⁹"Organizatsionnyi Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta RKP (b)" (Organizational Report of the Central Committee of the RCP (b),) Sochineniya, V, 212, translated and quoted in Fainsod, ibid.

²⁰Aleksandrov, Kto Upravlyaet Rossiei? ("Who Rules Russia?"), (Berlin: 1933), pp. 106-108, translated and quoted in Fainsod, ibid., pp. 190-191.

²¹Harasymiw, op. cit., p. 491.

²²Raymond A. Bauer implies the preference Party workers are given in obtaining better jobs, because of their political reliability in the fictional story "The Woman Doctor", Nine Soviet Portraits, (New York: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1955), pp. 42-59.

²³Nemzer, op. cit., p. 65.

²⁴Reshetar, op. cit., p. 148.

²⁵Ibid., p. 192.

²⁶Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 349-350.

²⁷Reshetar, op. cit., p. 199.

²⁸Ibid., p. 201.

²⁹Hazard, op. cit., p. 45. The Supreme Soviet is bicameral, consisting of a Council of Nationalities and a Council of the Union. Both have equal voting power. For a more complete description of Soviet elections see Max E. Mote, Soviet Local and Republic Elections: A Description of the 1963 Elections in Leningrad, (Stanford: California: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1965).

³⁰All acts and policies approved by the Supreme Soviet become laws. It is therefore illegal to not fulfill them.

³¹Reshetar, op. cit., p. 208.

³²Reshetar believes this occurs so the CPSU General Secretary can participate in state and diplomatic functions, op. cit., pp. 210-211.

³³This point is made in Harasymiw, op. cit., p. 491. He states the Secretariat is responsible for nomenklatura in the area of economy or social organizations with which it specializes.

³⁴Reshetar, op. cit., p. 217.

³⁵John A. Armstrong, Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 70.

³⁶For a more complete description of controls implemented in the Soviet Union see Reshetar, op. cit., pp. 230-232.

³⁷Armstrong, op. cit., p. 48.

CHAPTER THREE

ORGANIZATION AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF SOVIET SPORTS

Introduction

Up to this point the primary concern has been with the Communist philosophy, the Party and its control of the governmental apparatus. The CPSU is unique as a political party in that it not only influences political aspects of life but also non-political spheres of society.

Sports is one area under the influence of the Party. As the introduction stressed, sport in tsarist Russia was anything but salutary. In the very limited instances where Russian citizens enjoyed leisure-time activities, they tended to be of a passive nature. Not until the Bolsheviks came to power did any real sporting prowess begin. The Party's

... scope is all-embracing. It seeks to organize the total experience of man in Soviet society. Every branch of the economy and every form of social expression, from art, music, and letters to sports and the circus, are subject to administrative regulations and direction. The totalitarian imperative drives to transform the nation into a hierarchy of public servants operating within a framework of disciplined subordination to state purposes.¹

The all-embracing scope of the CPSU can be readily seen in Soviet sport. Party involvement takes many forms, some more subtle than others. The similarity of Soviet procedures in sports with Party and governmental activities will now be examined.

Organizational Structure

The most apparent political influence in sport is the organizational structure of the sporting administration. It is identical with the Party and governmental apparatus in its pyramidal structure and emphasis on democratic centralism.²

The unit analogous to the primary Party organization or governmental soviet is the physical culture kollektiv. Kollektiv representatives are elected to each higher level -- raion, city, okrug, oblast, krai, republic, All-Union -- of the sporting organization. They unanimously approve All-Union plans for sports and carry out Party policy in practical ways. Quite simply, the sporting organization is a mirror of the Party and governmental model from which it is derived.

Types of Organizations

In the Soviet Union there are two types of sporting organizations.

Richards summarizes the state-controlled aspect as:

... a number of institutions directly controlled by the state, such as schools, technical colleges, universities, the armed forces, etc. [where] sporting facilities are financed completely by the central authorities and physical training is often more or less compulsory.³

The other organization is the voluntary sports society. These societies originated after the decree of 1923, organizing sports according to the production principle.⁴ In 1957 there were 36 such bodies -- an example is Lokomotiv, for railway workers. Because there was one such society at each factory or place of work, the administration grew unwieldy. Therefore, in 1957 and 1958 the individual societies merged all their

workers into one republic sports society. Now there are united trade union volunteer sports organizations in each republic -- an example being Trud, RSFSR sports society.

The volunteer sports societies are financed largely by a state subsidy, but also by member's subscriptions and by profits made from the organization of public events.⁵

All-Union Organization Before 1959

In 1936 Stalin tightened state control of the sports organizations. All sport was placed under the State Committee for Physical Culture and Sport (AUC) of the Council of Ministers. Fainsod has defined state committees according to "the responsibilities vested in them."⁶ The Physical Culture and Sport Committee was likely classified under the committees that "[were] oriented around problems which cut across a number of ministries and areas and which [involved] planning, developmental, coordinating, and directive functions of peculiar difficulty."⁷


This state committee functioned as the highest sporting authority in the Soviet Union until 1959. At the Twenty-First Congress of the Communist Party, January 28, 1959, Khrushchev abolished the organization, replacing it with the Union of Sports Societies and Organizations of the USSR (USSO). He said:

Now a more expedient structure for the physical culture movement has been formed; public organizations participating in this movement will play the decisive role in it. A Federation of Public Sports Societies, not a governmental but a public organization is being set up.⁸

Morton⁹ has argued Khrushchev made these organizational changes to herald the transition from socialism to communism. This may have

influenced Khrushchev's decision but in all likelihood it was done for administrative and control reasons. By placing control in a public organization, there would be greater flexibility of action of sporting bodies. There would likewise be better coordination of local activities. In addition, Khrushchev was concerned about the former power bases of Malenkov and Kaganovich. By removing central control of a number of ministries and state committees, Khrushchev allowed his supporters at local levels to influence decisions in their area.¹⁰

The sporting hierarchy changed little from 1936 with the exception of the change in the All-Union organ and the consolidation of republic sports societies. Figure three shows the hierarchy at the present time. Since ministries are created or disbanded regularly, it is unknown how many would influence sport. They are not all included in the figure for this reason.



Party Control

It appears the USSO is in control of all sports in the Soviet Union. The All-Union Society "jointly with ministries, departments, and organizations, decides questions of development of physical culture and sport."¹² In reality, like all governmental action, the CPSU presents the policy and the government apparatus insures it is legislated properly. So it is with sports. USSO is not a policy making body. It unanimously approves all Party policy. The ministries, departments and state committees act as a checking control to ensure the policy is carried out correctly.

Fainsod's description of a committee covering many areas aptly fits USSO. The number of ministries involved in sport is great. For example, they include the Ministries of: Higher and Middle Special Education, Health, Culture, Defence, Education of Union Republic, Committee of State Security, Internal Affairs, Professional and Technical Education and Radio and Television Broadcasting, to name a few.

The extent of Party control can be diagrammatically seen by viewing the Ministry of Defence. As was mentioned earlier, ministries have corresponding Secretariat Departments in the Party apparatus. The Secretariat presents policy to the appropriate ministry and it implements the policy. Figure four shows the flow of authority. It is identical with the flow of authority in governmental decisions described in chapter two.





FIGURE FOUR: FLOW OF AUTHORITY. [ADAPTED FROM
POLITICAL SCIENCE 340 (POLITICAL SCIENCE OF THE
SOVIET UNION) CLASS NOTES.

Electoral Process

The electoral process is a repetition of CPSU elections. The individual physical culture kollektivs and sports clubs elect members to attend city and raion conferences. In theory these delegates elect a Presidium and Revision Committee to handle sports affairs when the conference is not in session. The identical process occurs at the oblast, republic and All-Union level.

In all likelihood the All-Union Presidium chooses delegates -- who are in turn elected -- to handle Presidium affairs from its lists of nomenklatura. This assumption will be explained in greater detail later.

Elections are an imitation of governmental ones. They demonstrate confidence in the regime and candidates are always elected with "enormous enthusiasm". Figure five reveals the electoral structure of directing organs of the USSR.



DELEGATES FROM TRADE UNION, KOMSOMOL, PHYSICAL CULTURE, SPORT, DEFENCE AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

PHYSICAL CULTURE DEPARTMENT

Bureaucracy

One problem of completely planning the economy of a nation as large as the Soviet Union is the large bureaucracy created. Under Stalin the control of the entire society was vested in the Politburo of the CPSU. Although there has been more delegation of authority in recent years, there is still a reluctance of leading Party officials to leave decisions to lower personnel or bodies.


Soviet bureaucracy has brought with it "red tape, delay, inefficiency, pre-occupation with formalities and routine, apathy, loss of contact with the masses, and neglect of the people's needs."¹⁵ One can sense the problem of a large bureaucracy by examining sporting organizations. It should be kept in mind that structures at the All-Union level are duplicated at lower levels. Figure five schematically showed the executive bodies appointed by the various conference delegates. Also under the central soviet of USSR are departments analogous to the Council of Ministers of the government and the Secretariat Departments of the CPSU.

These departments include: the International Sports Federation; the Federation of Union Republics; the International Athletic Committees; Sports Sections of Volunteer Sports Societies of Departments, Krais, Oblasts, and Large Cities; Trainer's Soviet; Judging Board; Permanent Commissions of Teaching Methodology, Mass Organization, International Sports Relations, Sport for Young People and Children, Propaganda, Discipline, Sports Buildings and Equipment, Sport Techniques; and Temporary Commissions. Additionally the Soviet of Scientific


Methodology, with its complex structure is under USSO control.

Several ministries are concerned with physical culture and sport in conjunction with the All-Union council. The Ministry of Education of the RSFSR, the Ministry of Higher and Special Education of the USSR and the Ministry of Health all have administrative levels dealing directly with sport.


Volunteer sports societies have their own administration. Since consolidation of all trade union sports groups, there is only administrative channels between sports groups at the All-Union level.



The individual physical culture kollektiv in the factory or plant makes the bureaucracy exceedingly more complex. Each kollektiv has a structure similar to that diagrammed below.



Whereas figure seven represents the overall view of a typical physical culture kollektiv, the sports sections of kollektivs are further divided into smaller administrative units. These are usually structured in the following way:



Complaints about lack of facilities and physical culture kollektivs in rural areas abound in the Soviet press. To combat this problem USSR ordered each republic to set up a volunteer rural sports society. These societies were the consolidated units of: rural consumer societies, the now defunct machine-tractor stations, kolkhozes, sovkhoses, radiotelegraph stations and repair plants. Much the same as the volunteer republic and territory sport society, each republic has a distinct name.¹⁹

Since the majority of the above administrative organs are duplicated at each level below the All-Union, it is no wonder the sporting administration -- as well as all Soviet society -- is troubled by inefficiency, red tape and lack of coordination.

With the sporting organization developed -- almost identical with that of the CPSU -- several other features of sport can be studied. These features will show the strong Party influence overriding the sporting fraternity. Some features are more subtle in nature than others but it can be argued that all have political roots. The following pages will show how strongly sports organizations and athletes are influenced by politics. It may not be readily discernible, nevertheless it is there.

"Nomenklatura" and Pick of Sports Leaders

As mentioned previously, the CPSU will not allow any opposition to its central control. It is responsible for all facets of Soviet life. By placing trustworthy and reliable Party members in positions

of authority, the Party is ensured of continued control, which comes via the nomenklatura defined in Chapter two.

The Secretariat at each level of the Party pyramid is responsible for the nomenklatura. As previously mentioned, appointments to the All-Union Secretariat departments are made by the CPSU CC. These choices are undoubtably dictated by the Politburo and General Secretary of the Party.

The Politburo appointments have been called first category nomenklatura. Harasymiw states that the positions included in the first category nomenklatura include: "the heads of the party's highest bodies (Secretariat and Auditing and Control Commissions) as well as the whole Presidium (since named Politburo) and Secretariat."²⁰

Second category nomenklatura is the responsibility of the Secretariat. It includes many of the public leaders of the Soviet Union in the military, sporting, government and press fields.

Third category nomenklatura is the responsibility of the Central Committee departments. This category makes appointments of "urban raion (that is borough or ward) party secretaries, leading staff of educational and scientific establishments, directors of the country's most important factories and posts in the central administration like inspectors and auditors."²¹ In 1965 it is believed there was a redistribution of nomenklatura authority among the three categories but the exact extent of this distribution is unknown.

The Party can therefore control the personnel at every level of the sporting hierarchy. Sports chairmen of USSO are appointed by the Secretariat second category nomenklatura. Managers and principals of

scientific institutions, physical culture institutes and voluntary sports clubs are included in the third category nomenklatura. The amount of control in choosing sports leaders has varied during the rule of various Party leaders. A brief history of the sporting administration will bring this into focus.

Brief History.

The highest sports governing body in the Soviet Union is the USSO. It was formed in 1959 after Khrushchev's resolution to the Twenty-First Party Congress. Basically it was to be responsible for functions previously under the jurisdiction of a state agency -- All-Union Council for Physical Culture -- established in April, 1930. The State agency was, in effect, a Ministry of Sport.

Prior to 1930, sports were under the jurisdiction of three separate entities. They were the military organization, the Young Communist League and the trade unions.

The military had been given responsibility of physical training of its personnel by Lenin, with his universal conscription decree of April 22, 1918. The following year this military responsibility was extended to include pre-military training for potential conscripts. The All-Union Military Organization (AMO) was therefore responsible for physical training for military personnel and its affiliated body, the General Reservists Organization (Vsevobuch) was to "provide elementary physical and military training before conscription into the Red Guard and later, the Red Army."²²

The Young Communist League (Komsomol or YCL) had been given

responsibility of working with AMO in setting up sports clubs and facilities for Soviet workers. In addition, Komsomol leaders resolved at the Third Congress of October, 1920, to "continue the battle against internal opposition from those who professed that sports should be non-political in character."²³ The resolution was aimed at the non-political Makkabi, Sehevardeniia and Scouts organizations.

Trade unions had become involved in sporting administration with the CPSU decree at the Twelfth Party Congress, April, 1923, organizing sports according to the production principle. Sports clubs were to be formed directly at the factory, school, office, farm or other places or work.

Thus, under Lenin's regime there was no sporting organization as such. The Party supervised sports indirectly through the military, trade unions and Komsomol. Party resolutions gave the three groups authority to establish and improve the standard of existing sports clubs. Stalin implemented tighter Party control through the AUC, the All-Union Ministry of Sport. Presently, sports are administered by the public organization USSO. Party control remains however, since USSO cannot make decisions without approval of the Council of Ministers. The Council, in turn, makes no decision without Party consent.

Consequently, directly or indirectly, the Party has controlled sports since the Bolsheviks took power. Sports leaders are likely chosen through second category nomenklatura, under the jurisdiction of the Secretariat. The appointments of sport administrators and the characteristics desired in these leaders can now be discussed.

Selection of Sports Leaders

Nemzer stated that "the major characteristic desired in workers [workers in the Party Apparatus] appears to be trustworthiness, rather than technical training."²⁴ Harasymiw, in his study of the nomenklatura, reiterates these remarks. He feels "advancement depends more on political than professional qualities."²⁵

This is readily apparent when viewing the sports leaders at the All-Union level. The first leader of the All-Union Council of Physical Culture was Nikolai K. Antipov, who had been a member of the Central Committee of the Party since 1924 and held the physical culture position as well as other administrative posts.

Antipov had no background in sport, but politically was a conscientious and hard-working chairman -- he made numerous and lengthy speeches, promoted the newly inaugurated GTO program, and launched the slogan "beat bourgeois sports records."²⁶

The second chairman, Vasilii N. Martsev, had some background in sport -- one of the founders of Dinamo sports society in 1923 -- but it is probable he was chosen because he was "a pre-revolutionary Party man and a high official of the dreaded Cheka (security police) since the early years of the Civil War."²⁷

In June, 1936, Martsev was replaced by I.I. Kharchenko. Kharchenko apparently had good sporting qualifications when he began his duties although the overriding factor in his placement was his Komsomol membership. He had worked up through the Young Communist League and nomenklatura officials could be assured of his political reliability. Kharchenko retained the position until July or August, 1937.

As is the case of much of Soviet life during the Stalin purges, it is unknown how many leadership changes occurred over the next few years. Morton comments:

No longer were new appointments announced, general background information of sports leaders given, and resolutions by the AUC regularly published.²⁸

It is known Kharchenko was replaced by a woman, E.L. Knopova, who was the first and only woman to be appointed chairman of the AUC. Her appointment appears to have been a stop-gap measure until a man could be found for the job. In October, 1937, A.V. Zelikov was appointed chairman, Knopova becoming vice-chairman. Zelikov was chairman until January, 1939 when Vasilii Snegov took leadership.

It is believed that in all probability Snegov guided the sport administration through the war years, although there is practically no official background available regarding him or his successors.²⁹

Nikolaii N. Romanov assumed leadership in 1945 and was replaced in May, 1948 by Colonel General Appolonov. Appolonov was "an MVD (security police) officer whose background for the job had been the command of the frontier guards."³⁰

Romanov, who remained vice-chairman under Appolonov, took over leadership after Stalin's death. He remained head of the All-Union body from March, 1953 until March, 1962. The present head of the USSO is Iurii Mashin. Mashin is a Party bureaucrat, who has risen up through the CPSU apparatus, apparently with little sporting experience.

Trends

The insistence of the CPSU to control the upper echelons of all

Soviet organizations has resulted in shortcomings. The brief history of the sports leaders and their appointments reveal several of these. Firstly, the comments by Nemzer and Harasymiw are illustrated in the leadership of the sporting administration. Political reliability and success at lower Party levels appears more important than a technical knowledge of sports and its organization. Secondly, the number of changes in chairmen is readily apparent. Over a period of thirty years, the chairmanship has been changed at least ten different times. Thirdly, there has been only one woman appointed chairman of the All-Union sports organization. Several of these criticisms point out the weaknesses of the USSR sports organization at the All-Union level as well as the Party's nomenklatura system.

Weaknesses of Nomenklatura System in Sports

Retention of Inefficient Workers

It is feasible that the changes in leadership of sporting organizations are due to the inefficiency of the chairmen. Only Kharchenko had extensive sporting qualifications and it would seem this would be a prerequisite for operation of a sporting organization.

Harasymiw has said:

... some 'leading workers' do feel that once in the nomenklatura they are entitled to a lifetime of office-holding and furthermore, they will do anything -- take a job no matter how unsuited for it they may be -- simply to continue to be a nomenklatura worker.³¹

This appears to hold true for the AUC and USSO chairmen, as many of them accepted the leadership of Soviet sports with little or no background in the field.

Poor Training of "Nomenklatura" Workers

One of the more valid reasons for the frequent changes in leadership of the All-Union sports organization is the poor training of the nomenklatura workers. Nomenklatura personnel receive their training in Party schools, primarily interested in political indoctrination rather than technical training. "Like military staff colleges, these institutions assure their graduates of successful promotion in the hierarchy."³² Hence capable administrators with an interest and background in sport will often be overlooked in favour of a reliable Party man because the experienced sports administrator has not attended Party schools.

Insufficient Recruitment of Women

Perhaps the most constantly heard complaint with regard to cadres is that not enough women are selected to leading posts. The nomenklatura is one area in which Soviet women do not enjoy the fully equal rights with men guaranteed them by the constitution.³³

The sporting leadership is a classic example of this nomenklatura criticism. Although women make up one-half of the working force in the Soviet Union, there has only been one woman, E.L. Knopova, in the chairmanship of the AUC. As has been previously mentioned, her appointment appears to be a stop-gap measure as the term of office was only three months -- August to October, 1937.

The failure of the nomenklatura to produce well-qualified leaders has not gone unnoticed. The Party press regularly criticizes the nomenklatura system for its shortcomings.³⁴ The question why sportsmen are not placed in positions of authority in USSR involves several factors.

Why Sportsmen Are Not in Administrative Positions

Time Involvement

John Armstrong discovered in his study of the Ukrainian republic that officials during the Stalin regime worked a twelve-hour day. Reasons given for the long day were the pressure of duties and the general fear that an underworked official might develop interests away from a Party career.³⁵

International sportsmen in Soviet society are expected to produce as efficiently as workers in any other facet of the industry. Young athletes in sports schools train progressively longer as they become more proficient in their sport. Master of Sport athletes and international champions train at least four hours per day. If it were possible to train and to handle Party responsibilities as well, this period would amount to a 16-hour day, seven days per week!³⁶

Party Vocation or Avocation?

Armstrong also found that "the Communist system frowns upon the development, especially by Party members and officials, of hobbies or avocations."³⁷ They [Party members and officials] are expected to be "politically developed with broad horizons and a lofty sense of dedication to the building of communism."³⁸ This makes it next to impossible to develop a skill level necessary for international competition and to attend the numerous seminars and part-time courses Party officials are expected to take. In addition, it is a debatable point as to which field the sportsman would consider a vocation and which an avocation.

Party Hesitancy to have Sportsmen in Authority

The leaders of the CPSU are hesitant to have sportsmen in positions of high authority for two reasons. As mentioned above, the Party expects members to be "dedicated communists" and models of the "New Soviet Man." Sportsmen often do not fit this mold. Soviet papers are filled with examples of drunkenness, rowdiness, individualistic behavior and payoffs reminiscent of "slush funds for North American athletes."³⁹

For example:

Sovietsky Sport recalled that Baku skipper Anatoli Banishevsky -- the national side's centre-forward at the 1966 World Cup -- was banned for life after a "drunken debauch" in his home town airport in 1969.

Edouard Streltsov drank and caroused continually. After he had separated from his wife and infant, his sporting instincts turned to women. He wound up in court on a charge of rape and when asked, "You worked where?" he replied, "In the committee of the Likhachev Auto Plant." "In what capacity?" "I played soccer."

... coaches of various sports societies recruit promising high school seniors, provide them with fictitious jobs, pay them to enter contests and turn them into "parasites" at an early age. According to the article, one high school graduate was given a fictitious coaching job at half pay, drew additional money "for competing, and was entirely excused from useful work."⁴⁰

The Party doctrine of worker dedication may have gotten its roots from Lenin. Krupskaya, Lenin's wife, wrote after his death that he had given up chess and skating because it took up so much valuable time, better spent in strengthening the Bolshevik cause in tsarist Russia.⁴¹

Lenin himself was aware that sportsmen often develop individualistic attitudes. He believed energy dissipated in sporting activity could be better spent in revolutionary activity.⁴²

Party leaders saw the benefits success in sports could bring, particularly international success. They tolerated outbursts of the above-mentioned behavior in return for medals obtained in World and Olympic competition. But to have such athletes in the chairmanship of USSO is another matter.

Another reason for Party hesitancy in having sportsmen in positions of authority could very well be the lack of indoctrination of athletes. The political indoctrination of athletes will be discussed later. Suffice it to say, international athletes cannot be fully indoctrinated to the "evils" of capitalist society. As a consequence the Party has:

... anathematized "peaceful coexistence" on ideological questions and the concept of a "single culture" resulting from the mutual assimilation of the cultures of the "bourgeois" West and "socialist" East, while in the sphere of sport Communist theorists have for the last ten years been propagating the idea of "peaceful coexistence" and a "single" world sporting culture.⁴³

Since communism is inevitable in the eyes of the CPSU, the Party's doctrine emphasizes the overthrow of the capitalist system throughout the world. Sportsmen, on the other hand, are taught peaceful friendship with athletes from capitalist countries. Because individualistic behavior and peaceful coexistence is tolerated in Soviet athletes, they are not given administrative positions. To place a sportsman in a position of administrative authority might result in the undermining of the communist ideal of the "New Soviet Man" and the inevitable overthrow of capitalism.

Sportsmen's Hesitancy to Accept Positions

It not only is the Party that is hesitant about sportsmen in administrative positions but the international athletes themselves. Quite frankly, they are better off than the Party officials. They spend no more than six hours a day preparing for something they enjoy anyway. The Party man works twelve hours a day at a position in which he may have no technical knowledge as well as having to attend classes in the evening.

Secondly, athletes are idolized as are sports heroes everywhere. Why give up the limelight to accept an administrative position with none of the glory of an international sportsman?

Thirdly, the athletes have excellent housing comforts and luxuries. They have their own apartments and cars -- very uncommon in the overcrowded Soviet cities and in an economy not geared to the manufacture of consumer items -- and international competitors have the added chance of travel outside the Soviet Union. This is guaranteed to only the highest and most trusted officials of the country, which does not necessarily include the chairman of USSO.

Fourthly, the athlete can achieve success through his own physical skill and hard work. The Party worker finds this not to be so. The harder he works, the more demanded of him. Armstrong intimates the dilemma Party workers find themselves in.

Since the republic secretary realizes that his future promotions are based on the economic well-being of his territory, he often over-steps the bounds of his job description.⁴⁴

Throughout the Party apparatus, workers find success and fulfillment

of Party plans and policies are all important. He has to cheat and cut corners to get ahead.⁴⁵ The Party works on this principle and can always dismiss people for this reason. The athlete does not have this worry. He is replaced only if convicted of bad behavior, his prowess has been surpassed by another athlete, or he has failed repeatedly in international competition.

Lastly, the Soviet system does not operate on the profit motive, common to capitalist countries. The profit motive has been replaced by a system of monetary rewards and state orders, one of the highest being the Order of Lenin. Political workers have legitimate complaints in the presentation of these awards. Athletes receive them with great regularity, Party officials work decades without receiving them.

All of the above are legitimate reasons for sportsmen to remain active in sports and shun the administrative offices of the USSR.

Retired Athletes

The question of recruiting former athletes with a talent for administrative work can also be raised. Here again, former athletes may not be as politically reliable as those who have never entered international competitions. Secondly, the athlete, in most instances, has a natural tendency to enter the coaching of sports after his playing days are over. As the same incentives are available for coaching success as athletic success, the athlete probably will accept a coaching role rather than one of administration.

The preceding section has dealt with CPSU control in the organization of sports. The sporting apparatus mirrors the Party structure.

Party control is maintained by appointing trusted workers to positions of authority in the sports structure. But Party control also occurs by more subtle means, some of which will be discussed in the next section. Considered here will be underlying political policies often inherent in Soviet sports and sportsmen and the more practical administrative policies of fulfilling the State Plan.

Political Policies Underlying Sports

Socialist Realism in Relation to Sports

While the concept [Socialist Realism] is not always clearly or consistently defined, generally it means that an artistic production (be it a novel or painting) must be presented in a form readily comprehensible to the average man. At the same time, art must avoid mere portrayal of present conditions; instead, the artist or writer must portray the models that the regime promises will eventually become typical of Soviet life.⁴⁶

Socialist realism has not ended with the writing of novels and paintings. The CPSU expects sports to "serve the noble aims of strengthening the health and harmonious development of the new man, the builder of communist society."⁴⁷ For this reason sports and sportsmen can also be thought of as proponents of socialist realism. Although normally thought of only in terms of art and writing, the following discussion will indicate the argument of socialist realism in sports.

The New Soviet Man is physically and morally strong with no hint of selfishness or individualism. Children learn from an early age the loyalty they owe to the Soviet state. Vandivert and Vandivert have written:

The Communist Party Leader (District) welcomes the children and tells them to be thankful for their fine education -- first to the state, then to their teachers, and then to their parents.⁴⁸

The CPSU is intent on really creating a New Soviet Man as the above quotation suggests. When children learn the priority of loyalty beginning with the socialist state, a spirit of communism rather than individualism will be engrained in them.

Towards this end the CPSU has many examples that seek to show the superiority of the Soviet regime. Daley describes one such incident during the Rome Olympics of 1960.

The Russians are the biggest group. Their leader holds the flag at arm's length in one hand, the pole exactly perpendicular, the flag flowing back over his head. It takes perhaps ten minutes to circle the track, and one waits for the man's arm to collapse from the strain. But he never flinches, and when his delegation is finally all in place he is still holding the flag out there in one hand at arm's length.⁴⁹

A morally strong Soviet man shows no emotion or as little as possible at winning or losing. Soviet athletes have gained the reputation as excellent sportsmen. They win gracefully and lose honorably. In 1961 the Soviets lost to Czechoslovakia in the World Hockey Tournament. The delirious Czechs went wild with delight at the defeat of the Soviet Union.

While this was going on the Russian team stood at attention at the blue line, waiting to listen to the Czech anthem, waiting to salute the victors. Because the happy Czechs couldn't contain themselves, couldn't form their own line, the Russians had to wait a long time.

They waited, chins up, staring straight ahead though many another team would not have.⁵⁰

What many people, including Daley, interpret as good sportsmanship, the CPSU feels is the influence of the Soviet regime and an example of socialist realism all Soviet citizens will demonstrate in the future. Athletes themselves expound the glories of the state rather than attributing victories to their own hard work. During the Stalin regime, they not only thanked the state but Stalin as well! When Mikhail Botvinnik won an international chess tournament in 1936 he sent a telegram to Stalin. It read in part:

This [the chess win] was possible only because I sensed behind me the support of my whole country, the care of our government and our party and above all that daily care which you, our great leader, have taken and still take, to raise to unprecedented heights our great motherland and to rear in us representatives of Soviet youth a healthy and joyful generation in all fields of our socialist construction.⁵¹

K. Koberidze said, "he was thinking of his Fatherland, which had nurtured him, had given him mastery and knowledge"⁵² before he entered a wrestling match in the European championships.

Whether or not Soviet athletes are simply mouthing the CPSU policy of socialist realism or if they mean it will be hard to discern.⁵³ The state makes every effort to keep its athletes isolated from outside contacts with other athletes.⁵⁴ In the 1952 Olympics, the first the Soviet Union entered, they refused to stay in the Olympic Village, preferring the barbed-wire enclosed compound erected as a security precaution.

Soviet athletes never enter international competition unless they win or have the potential to win an event. Walsh succinctly states this policy.

In attempting to prove that superior athletes are the product of a superior system, therefore, they must look superior on the field of competition.⁵⁵

For a Soviet athlete to lose badly would not justify the superiority of the Soviet political regime nor establish socialist realism.

Reporting of Sports

Socialist realism is more evident in news reports of sporting events than in the actions of the Soviet athletes themselves. An editorial in Pravda attributes athletic success to the Soviet regime. "The Party and the leadership have created unparalleled conditions for Soviet athletes to perfect their techniques and skills."⁵⁶ As will be seen later, this is not the state of sport for everyone but only the highly-skilled international competitor. The newspaper writer is portraying the ideal of the future.

Socialist realism is most readily apparent after Soviet successes internationally. After the Soviet Olympic victory in Rome, Pravda wrote:

This is a triumph for all Soviet sport, which is an inseparable part of socialist culture, and clear new evidence of the indisputable advantages of the free socialist society, ...⁵⁷

After losing internationally, Soviet writers tend to ignore results rather than explain these setbacks to the average Soviet citizen. Since the Soviet worker learns little more of the western world than what he reads in the Soviet press, writers are able to build up the Soviet system and criticize the capitalist one. To explain sporting losses to readers would undermine the ideal of socialist realism. The poor

showing of Soviet athletes at the Mexico Olympics in 1968 brought some criticism the first day. As the failures continued "the Soviet press published no reports on the progress of the Games nor the final results."⁵⁸

Socialist realism and its use in painting and writing is a definite CPSU policy to portray the communist state of the future. Because the CPSU controls the news media, the printed word often cannot be taken at face value. The Party accepts information, rejects or slants it, depending on whether it is acceptable as socialist realism. As athletes can help portray this realism of the New Soviet Man, the state also expects proper and appropriate behavior particularly in international competition.

The Operational Code and Principle of Expediency

In Relationship to Sports

Communism bases its political action on the writings of Marx-Engels and Lenin. These writings serve as a guide to action and many everyday occurrences are based on them. For example, socialist realism is considered to be carried out when a Soviet athlete shows good sportsmanship or thanks the government for the opportunity to participate internationally.

Two principles advocated by Lenin have particular significance in the CPSU rise to power in 1917. They are the operational code and the principle of expediency. The operational code was developed from the over-riding principle of expediency. Lenin used the most advantageous means to further the Bolshevik cause. He developed a set of rules

to justify these means and termed them the operational code. Meyer summarizes the code as follows:

... fight as long as the remotest chance of victory is still given; never give up until the movement has been repelled decisively. This rule is complemented by another: do not engage in battle if you know you are licked from the start. Further: use all means available to carry on the struggle. At the same time, do not rely on any of the means employed, for they are all but means, and can be scrapped, thrown away, replaced. Do not become a slave of the tool you employ.⁵⁹

The principle of expediency was necessary during the term of office of the provisional government. Earlier, speaking about the Mensheviks, Lenin had told workers:

We shall support [any other group] depending exclusively on whether or not we should then be able to better strike a blow against our enemy.⁶⁰

Until the Bolsheviks could gain the support of the masses, Lenin needed the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries to wrest control from the Tsar. The tsarist regime was the bigger enemy in Lenin's eyes. When it was destroyed, he would worry about the factions that formed the Provisional Government.

Analogy to Sports

The two principles have special significance for Soviet sport. A strong analogy can be made from the philosophy of sport found in the Soviet Union and the basic premises of the operational code and the principle of expediency.

Operational Code in Sports

1. Engaging in battle only when winning is predicted.

This was particularly evident after World War II when the Soviet Union was re-entering world and international competitions. "Although the Soviet Union had been admitted to the International Olympic Committee in 1947, it chose not to compete the following year."⁶¹ They did have many observers at London to view the proceedings. No Soviet athletes took part because the CPSU could not afford a Soviet defeat.

Walsh reports an incident during the 1950 international weight-lifting championships. When Iakov Routsenko realized he could not beat the American John Davis, he refused to try his three lifts.

At a 1957 international weight-lifting competition in Milan, Italy, the Soviets were not sure of doing well. "Although the Soviets entered a team of weight-lifters, and even sent them to Milan, they merely watched the other teams work out in the gym and decided not to offer opposition." Similarly, "in the world mountain skiing championships held in Chile in 1966, the Soviet team did not take part because 'they had no chance of medals'." "No Russian team is sent abroad unless adequate and extensive preparations have been made. Athletes are rigorously trained, often at special camp sites and selected with great care."⁶²

The Soviet Union placed great importance in defeating other members of the communist community, particularly the satellite countries. Before entering World and Olympic competitions, the Soviets were notorious for fixing matches and refusing to let satellite teams win fairly.

In matches with the satellites, the element of competition is somewhat affected by the fact that everyone understands

what the Soviet official attitude is in sports. As in all other walks of life, the idea of superiority is intrinsically tied up with the concept of invincibility. Consequently it is not "diplomatic" for satellite teams to defeat Soviet competitors.⁶³

During a boxing match in Hungary, the Hungarian champion had knocked down the Soviet boxer, "The referee in the ring counted so slowly that the Soviet boxer had time to rest and continue the match."⁶⁴

However world opinion would not stand for such practices, particularly in international competitions. The Soviets have therefore not relied on illegitimate means. They use other methods, not relying on any particular one but any that will help the Party cause. This follows from Lenin's operational code. Soviet sports methods are, for the most part, highly scientific and legitimate and criticism of subsequent victories would be unjustified.

2. Use of any means to win.

The fixing of contests in the pre-Olympic and World competition period of Soviet sports was the most consistent way the CPSU could guarantee success. Since entering international events, this is not acceptable. A Soviet victory that was fixed and seen by millions of television viewers would do nothing to help prove the superiority of their system.

There are still questionable practices by the Soviet Union in the field of sports. Since the Tokyo Olympics in 1964, Game officials have been worried about illegal practices in drugs and the sex of some women athletes. All women competitors are obliged to pass a sex test, proving they are female.

One of the first international competitions to use the sex test was the 1966 European track and field championships. Five women, including the famous Press sisters from the Soviet Union, withdrew from the competition rather than submit to the test...., it is extremely unlikely the Press sisters would have been allowed to withdraw from the competition if they had been able to pass the test.⁶⁵

Albert feels one of the reasons the Soviet team did so poorly in the Mexico Olympics was "the absence from the Soviet female squad (until recently regarded as second to none) of world record-holders who could not be relied upon to pass the recently introduced sex test."⁶⁶ He also attributes the crack down on the use of stimulants as a major setback to the Soviet Union in the Mexico Olympics. Spot tests are given to athletes immediately following an event. To be under the influence of a stimulant would be more of a disgrace politically than the loss of the event.

Albert specifically cites the impossibility of the Soviet Union of using aero-ionization. In 1963, Iurii Marin discussed the development of an aero-ion-generator. He stated that "by means of these devices, Soviet sportsmen are exposed to the effect of 'negative-charged ions' which, it is claimed, considerably increase stamina and sporting ability."⁶⁷

Since Lenin approved the use of both illegal and legal means in winning, there is no moral dilemma for Soviet officials in using both during sporting competitions.⁶⁸ Not all Soviet sports practices are of an illegal nature. The Soviet Union has introduced many highly scientific and innovative methods in sports. For example, Anatolii Tarasov, former national hockey coach of the Soviet Union, has a

complete dossier of every Soviet player and opponents the Soviet Union is likely to face in international competition. It contains the player's weaknesses, strengths and tendencies in stressful situations.

Tarasov also initiated some highly successful coaching techniques. Soviet players practice with heavier equipment than is used in games. Twenty players are on the ice at one time during practice sessions, demanding more concentration, more accurate passing and better positional play.

Outstanding athletes are filmed and their styles are completely analyzed. The most efficient style is then taught to all Soviet players in that particular sport.⁶⁹

The Soviet Union also makes use of sportsmen and coaches from other countries. Hungary, a strong wrestling country, has several coaches in the Soviet Union, instructing wrestling. "Numerous principles derived from yoga are also being applied in training sportsmen."⁷⁰ Delegates from Russian training institutes have travelled to India to learn principles of yoga to better equip Soviet athletes psychologically for competition.

One of the largest and most controversial tools used by the CPSU in its fight to prove the superiority of the Soviet system is the use of the state amateur. It has been argued that Soviet athletes are really professional that they hold no real job and simply train and prepare for international competitions. That athletes receive monetary and economic rewards cannot be denied. Since most of these are given conspiratorially, there is no way of proving the Soviets are anything but amateur.⁷¹

Principle of Expediency

The principle of expediency is a logical Leninistic doctrine to support the Soviet Union's entry into the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Before joining IOC in 1947, the Soviet Union would participate with capitalistic sports clubs "only if there were absolutely no worker sports clubs in a country, or in backward countries where the bourgeoisie was still considered to be playing a positive role in feudal society." To join international sports federations or participate in the Olympic games was unthinkable. The Olympics were "branded bourgeois-inspired to deflect the workers from the class struggle while training them for new imperialist wars."⁷²

When the Soviet Union joined IOC the principle of expediency permitted Soviet writers to state that the Olympic Games "cannot help attract the youth with its purity, striving for peace, friendship and cooperation among peoples."⁷³ The IOC was seen as the lesser of two evils. Warfare would only result in ultimate destruction of the world. Communism could be spread by other means, one of which is proving Soviet sports superiority. By defeating the United States -- which the Soviet Union sees as the major capitalistic and imperialistic power -- continually on the sports field, other third-world countries and workers in capitalistic countries would see the superiority of communist governments. Volk has said: "Sport successes are aimed at gaining sympathy for the Soviet Union in non-Communist countries and to present it to the West as a centre of flourishing culture."⁷⁴

Therefore, by joining IOC, the Soviet Union could possibly defeat capitalism, i.e. the United States. Once communism had a firm grip on

the world, the bourgeois IOC could be dealt with. That the Soviet Union is using the IOC for its own purposes is intimated in a German-language periodical. The writer has stated:

USSR sports organizations are represented in 45 international federations with 84 Soviet representatives in leading positions. ... In 1963 the USSR was maintaining sports relations with 88 countries throughout the world, "consistently fighting against political and racial discrimination in international sports." But this did not prevent the Soviets from systematically cutting West Berlin out of sports competition since the 1955 European boxing championships, refusing to play Formosa at the 1961 basketball championships because Red China wanted it that way, or refusing to participate in the 1962 Chamonix skiing championship or the 1962 Colorado Springs ice hockey world tournament because the Soviet Union wanted it that way. ... But when their own important chances and opportunities are at stake -- such as the 1964 Dortmund and Grenoble figure skating world and European championships -- then the Soviets are not concerned with displaying "socialist solidarity" for the "barred zone".⁷⁵

The Soviet Union sports organization and policy use the political strategies of Lenin to be better able to strike a blow against capitalism on the sports fields.

CPSU Policy on Religion and Influence on Sport

The CPSU has forbidden its members to believe in a Supreme Being and through its program of scientific atheism, has attempted to abolish religion all together.

Marx regarded religion as the "opiate of the masses" allowing them to be satisfied with their present hardships in hopes of a better existence in the after-life.

Communists assume "that religious belief is a 'remnant of capitalism' which should disappear once changes in the economic base and in the mode of production have made its presence unnecessary in the Marxist

superstructure."⁷⁶

Communist doctrine denies the possibility of divine creation of man. "Man is viewed as nothing more than an earthly, physical being who is part of the matter of which the universe consists."⁷⁷ This view of man is compatible with the materialistic concept of the world expounded by Marx and Lenin.

All philosophy is therefore scientific. To account for any phenomena with other than scientific data is incompatible with Soviet belief.

Science is seen as holding the key to a complete understanding of the material universes of which man is regarded as a part. Religion is equated with superstition.⁷⁸

Since any phenomena can be explained scientifically, the CPSU refutes all arguments to the contrary. Coaches and athletes are expected to do the same. Therefore, natural ability in athletes is contradictory to this belief. Presumably, also refuted is the idea of the athlete who has a spiritual awareness about a sport and does not train intensively. This awareness can be best explained by the following monologue of a long distance runner, who was running, not in competition but because he wanted to.

From my first step I felt lighter and looser than ever before. My thin shirt clung to me, and I felt like a skeleton flying down a wind tunnel. My times at the mile and two miles were so fast that I almost felt I was cheating, or had taken some unfair advantage. It was like getting a new body that no one else had heard about. My mind was so crystal clear I could have held a conversation. The only sensation was the rhythm and the beat; all perfectly natural, all and everything part of everything else. ... Furiously I ran; time lost all semblance of meaning. Distance, time, motion were all one. There were myself, the cement, a vague feeling of legs, and the coming dusk.⁷⁹

Soviet sport relies on statistics and scientific data almost entirely. Where psychological methods are used, as in yoga exercises, the religious and spiritual aspects are ignored or eliminated.

The use of scientific methods is important and the CPSU policy of scientific atheism has initiated many useful and practical programs in athletics. However, the fact that the Party rejects the spiritual side of man means they fail to explore an equally important aspect of sports, as the monologue of the long distance runner indicates. It also dictates the excessive use of science at the expense of the psychological and spiritual side of sports.

The almost paranoiac obsession with statistics is an excellent example of the belief that science is the key to understanding. Sports articles are inundated with statistics.

... there are at present 35, 269 sportsmen with the title of "Master of Sport" and over 224,000 sportsmen of the first category; professional sports and physical culture instructors number 140,000.⁸⁰

This preoccupation with scientific statistics extends to the athletes themselves. Janis Lysis, in training for the Tokyo Olympics:

... ran 51.6 km. (32 miles) of repetition sprints; he did 5,317 running broad jumps and standing jumps; he lifted 188.5 tons in various weight-lifting exercises; he threw weights and medicine balls 2474 times and put the shot 952 times.⁸¹

Athletes are purposely given scientific data in hopes it will improve their performance. Nikolai Ozolin, former European pole vault champion states:

The clear and precise methods, etc., ensures not only a more successful mastery of sports techniques and tactics

but also the more effective development of strength, speed, endurance, the rearing of moral qualities and will power, and better results in competitions. The sportsman accumulates a big reserve of knowledge and experience, making it possible for him to train more effectively, be successful in competition and later on go teaching and training.⁸²

Former USSR track and field coach Gavril Korobkov has stated "we don't put much store by inherent ability." What is important, according to Korobkov, is "the great capacity for work of both our athletes and coaches; the striving for perfection, patriotism and the urge to prove themselves superior; superb physical fitness; and the most important, science."⁸³

Training is always scientific. Nothing is left to chance as Lysis' training schedule indicates. Korobkov succinctly stated the USSR policy when he said:

We always plan training well ahead. And continuity is essential. The athlete must know the shape of his training several years in advance. Details are worked out for the year and he knows day for day what he will do each month.⁸⁴

The director of the Central Physical Culture Research Institute sees the New Soviet Man as one "whose organism is characterized by the highest development and condition of correlation of all his functions, organs and systems with one another and with the surrounding social and natural milieu."⁸⁵ Spiritual awareness is not an important part of Soviet man.

Disadvantages of Scientific Emphasis

Disadvantages occur when everything is placed on a scientific basis. Scientific theories often prove to be wrong. For example, the

theory that mass participation will naturally lead to inexhaustible international reserves was criticized in Legkaia Atletika in 1964.

It is simply a fact that after the Olympics in Rome all our sports organizations were able to give the joint team only three new girls who were able to gain points for us.⁸⁶

Fizkul'tura i Sport blamed the gymnastic team loss to Czechoslovakia on "the system of instruction and training."⁸⁷ In particular the magazine criticized the specialization of younger children in one sport. Also abolished because of Soviet sport failures were the practice of having athletes compete in many different events; the specialization of children in a particular event; and the alternating of exercises for staying power, speed and long-distance.

The Soviet Union does adopt practices from other countries of a spiritual nature. For example in 1958 the USSR Academy of Sciences visited India to study yoga methods to improve their sportsmen. Fizkul'tura i Sport wrote "that by rejecting the idealistic aspect of the philosophical teachings of Yogi exponents, it was possible to utilize their system of physical training."⁸⁸ The fact they discarded the philosophical side of yoga indicates the lack of interest in the higher values and spiritual awareness, yoga can give. Everything is done to play down the aspect of sports as an end in themselves. The scientific means to an end is always placed at the forefront. This is particularly evident in the research centres found in the Soviet Union. Marin has declared:

Probably the most direct reason for Soviet successes is the serious advance preparation undertaken and the methodical approach to all fields of sport. Specialist institutes study

the physiological aspects of training as well as successes achieved and systems evolved abroad...⁸⁹

The research done at these institutes is invaluable for physical educators. It applies scientific theories in practical sporting situations. The significance of the research is that it is done on government and Party orders. This not only indicates Party control of scientific institutions but the research as well. As long as the Party refutes the spiritual aspect of man, research will always be of a technical and scientific nature.

Uses of Sports

Sports in the Soviet Union, in keeping with Lenin's operational code, are merely a tool used for another end. All of Soviet society is subordinate to the Party. Therefore sports and leisure-time activities cannot simply be a pursuit for its own sake but for some Party cause. This is the biggest criticism of Soviet sports. The ends, for which the Party uses sport as a tool, are often excellent. Some of these will be discussed now. It must be kept in mind that the Party leaders see sports as an excellent way of retaining control of the masses as well as furthering Party goals.

Control of Deviant Behavior

As is the case of all nations, the Soviet Union is troubled with deviant behavior such as drunkenness, juvenile delinquency and law breaking.

All factories, housing complexes, schools and clubs are obligated

to fulfill Party plans. These plans will be dealt with in more detail later. One such plan was given to the Leningrad City Soviet of Toiler's Deputies in the fight against juvenile delinquency that had increased during 1970.

Because juvenile delinquency is seen as contrary behavior to the ideal of the New Soviet Man and beyond the supervision of the Party apparatus, the Party attempts to rehabilitate offenders and control the spread of delinquent behavior through sports and athletic clubs.

Among the resolutions the City Soviet of Toiler's Deputies undertook were the "working out by January 15, 1970 concrete measures for strengthening the work toward prevention of neglect and delinquency among children and adolescents." No instructor without experience in work with children was to be allowed to work with them. The qualified instructors were to improve the "mass-health and sport work with children and adolescents... and to conduct annual spartakiads in summer and winter sports for adolescents at their place of residence."⁹⁰ The rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents through increased and improved sporting outlets is a noble aim. It becomes slightly tarnished with the realization that it is not so much to rehabilitate adolescents as it is to regain Party control of the child.

Increased Productivity

With the CPSU decree of April, 1923, sports were organized directly at factories, schools, offices and other places of work. Workers were given calisthenics and physical activity during the working day. Here again, the break from work was not so much a form of relaxation as it

was a way to increase the fitness of the working population. This increased fitness would in turn lead to greater productivity in labour.

As Ponomarev has stated:

It [Physical Education] helps increase efficiency and productivity of labour because it improves man's health, perfects his movements, reduces fatigue, and cultivates those qualities of character and will-power that are valuable from the point of view of society (courage, perseverance in pursuing an end, team spirit, etc.).⁹¹

Control of Non-Party Masses

A popular misconception of many people in western countries is the idea that all Soviet citizens are communists. This is not the case.

"The total strength of the party is now given as 14,455,321, of whom 13,810,089 are full members and 645,232, probationary members."⁹²

The Party, however, must control the large number of non-Party citizens. It maintains this control indirectly through public and quasi-political organizations. By assuring that a Party worker is in a position of authority in the organization, the non-Party members are controlled.

The establishment of sports clubs is a major Party method of controlling citizens. By controlling leisure, the Party can combat citizen's "susceptibility to negative influences, in particular to proneness to adopt a destructive attitude to prevailing social norms."⁹³

Unfortunately the Party's efforts have not been altogether successful. Workers spend much of their leisure time drinking vodka and playing simple card games and dominoes. Not only the workers have scorned the Party's efforts at organizing leisure but the young people as well.

... in Donetsk and Makeyevka in the very center of the Donbass stand magnificent palaces of culture where the

cultural officials complain of insufficient attendance. And nearby youth cafes remain empty because their atmosphere is not conducive to intercourse.⁹⁴

Organization of People

Probably the greatest asset of the Communist Party is its ability to organize people. This is readily apparent in the spartakiads held every four years. Spartakiads are arranged to take place the year before an Olympic year. National coaches will then have some idea of the athletes who will compete in the Olympic Games. The Fifth Spartakiad was held in 1971, with 45,000,000 athletes competing. The final events attracted 8,000 athletes and were completed in 27 days.⁹⁵ The ability to accomplish such a feat is to a large extent a reflection of the Party's organizational ability. This ability even impressed Avery Brundage, President of the International Olympic Committee.

As an engineer by profession I want to note the exemplary order of the conduct of the parade, in which more than 20,000 persons took part. One performance gave way to another exactly according to plan and to the minute.⁹⁶

Sport for Military Purposes

The use of sport for military purposes is more pronounced than any other in the Soviet Union. This is due to several reasons. Firstly, since the thirteenth century there have been approximately 160 wars in the Soviet Union. This has made the Soviet government very "invasion conscious." Secondly, Marxist philosophy expounds the doctrine of the proletarian revolution against capitalism. Lenin realized that Soviet citizens would have to defend the Bolsheviks at home and be ready to spread the revolution abroad. To accomplish this, he needed physically

fit men. Therefore the All-Union Military Organization and the General Reservists Organization were given the initial responsibility for physical and military training of Soviet youth.

This military influence in sports is in existence even today. In 1969 USSO "created a special council for further improvement of physical training of pre-conscription and conscription youth."⁹⁷ In addition, the schools offer curricular and extra-curricular instruction in military training.

Every Soviet child receives instruction "in those basic muscular arts that will make him useful as a soldier."⁹⁸ These exercises were consolidated into a program -- Gotov k trudu i oborone (GTO) -- in 1931. Marchiony describes the three levels of the program as follows:

The first is the youth level which includes fourteen and fifteen-year olds. In order to receive recognition, these boys and girls must become reasonably proficient in such exercises as morning calisthenics, skiing, grenade throwing and hiking. The first level of G.T.O. is for boys and girls, sixteen to eighteen years of age, who must, among other things, learn marksmanship. The highest G.T.O. rating is the second level (nineteen years and older) who learn parachute jumping, driving and mountain climbing.⁹⁹

If military units are important, then the Party's emphasis on military physical fitness has been a success. Today the Soviet Union has one of the most efficient and well-disciplined fighting forces in the world. Sports are also used to prove the superiority of the communist system. This will be dealt with later.

Nothing can be outside the control of the CPSU apparatus and nothing is undertaken or allowed that will not further the Party's cause. Sports cannot be an end in themselves but a means of accomplishing

some other goal.

Administrative Obligations of Sport

State amateurs are considered by the Soviet regime as workers building the new communist state. They are thus entitled to participate in international and Olympic competition. This right brings with it certain obligations. As sportsmen and coaches are workers they must fulfill the duties and quotas expected of workers in other facets of the society. Some of these obligations and their effects on sports will be considered now.

CPSU Planned Economy and Effect of Sports

Soviet Union Economy

The economy of the Soviet Union has been termed a "command economy" because all important decisions are made by public officials. This differs greatly from capitalist countries where the economy is based on consumer demands and industry's ability to meet these demands. The CPSU sets the amount to be produced and what goods are to be produced. "The system involves, in effect, permanent rationing and perpetual mobilization."¹⁰⁰

Planning by the Party

Party directives regarding planning are usually of two types, long-term (five or seven years) and short-term (annual plan). As of 1965, long-term plans are under the direction of Gosplan and annual plans under the authority of the All-Union Economic Council. "In practice,

only the short-term operational plans -- up to one year -- can be detailed. Long-range planning can only set approximate production targets."¹⁰¹

Problems are numerous when the whole of Soviet economy has to be planned. Reshetar has said:

The need to mobilize and allocate resources and to maintain a near-perfect balance between the various factors of production (capital, labor, transportation) requires that planning be based on accurate data and valid assumptions.¹⁰²

The problem involves economic goals set too close to the theoretical capacity of the available resources. Party officials surmise that maximum efficiency and output will be the result of a plan set close to theoretical capacity. The result has been the exact opposite. Plant managers hoard materials, under-produce to get a lower quota the next year, tend to retain older styles because they are easier to produce, and generally shy away from innovations or changes.

Fulfilling the Plan

Workers in industry have discovered several ingenious methods of fulfilling Party plans. As well as those mentioned above, managers pad their accounts in order to improve performance records and produce in quantity rather than quality. The result has been large quantities of shoddy items consumers refuse to buy.

The whole system is characterized by:

... mass assault on a single objective or a relatively narrow range of objectives, while other considerations are ignored until their sheer neglect causes sufficient problems so that they in turn, rise to a higher position on the scale of priority and become the focus of mass assault.¹⁰³

Effects on Sports

The planned economy dictated by the CPSU has as much an effect on sports as other branches of Soviet society. The preoccupation with statistics discussed above is a result of this planning. Sports clubs are measured in terms of the number of participants; coaches, the number of successful athletes; and athletes, the number of sport rankings acquired.

Planning in Sports

In chapter one the policy of democratic centralism was discussed. In essence, the policy dictates the subordination of lower bodies to higher bodies.

Sports organizations are also administered according to democratic centralism. Long-range and annual policy are established at the All-Union level. The republic, city, rural district and primary sports kollektivs are to implement this policy in practical ways.

Long Range and Short Range Plans

Reshetar stated that long range plans are only approximate in their production targets. The same is true for sports. Five-year plans are very general and macrocosmic in their scope.

Nikiforov feels the reason for these general plans is that:

By drawing up annual and four year plans all kinds of contests (Spartakiads, USSR championships, various complex contests, etc.) can be planned more precisely.¹⁰⁴

One of the first long-range sports plans was the CPSU Central Committee decree of 1923 which set sport up according to the production

principle. This meant sports clubs were set up at places of work, schools, and factories. Today the result of this policy can be seen in the sports societies existing in the Soviet Union. Another long-range sport plan was the setting up of sport according to the massovost' principle. The principle was adopted from Siberia where one athlete was obligated to have two other people enter sport. Massovost' was established in 1925 as a means of

... educating the masses (in as much as physical culture develops will power and builds up endurance, teamwork, resourcefulness and other valuable qualities) and in addition as a means of rallying the broad masses of workers and peasants around the various party, soviet and trade union organizations, through which the masses of workers and peasants are to be drawn into social and political activity.¹⁰⁵

Concurrently the principle would help develop international athletes because of the broad foundation of massovost'. To achieve this CPSU principle, the training program "Ready for Labor and Defense [of the USSR]" (GTO) was set up. It was first introduced in 1931 and

... now consists of two main parts -- a general and a special part. The first part, which is compulsory, consists of a number of elementary exercises for the all-round development of the body. The second voluntary part contains more advanced exercises that are designed to develop speed, agility, endurance and strength. Participants in the second phase are entered in sports according to these four categories.¹⁰⁶

Participants in the program are rated according to their ability and achievement. There are six categories of ability beginning with Juvenile sportsman second class, up through Juvenile sportsman first class, Sportsman third class, Sportsman second class, Sportsman first class and ending with Master of Sport.¹⁰⁷

It is the obligation of republic sports organizations to fulfill these plans. At the Fifteenth Congress of the Komsomol, USSR chairman Iurii Mashin indicated the aim of state planning should be the establishment of "physical culture and sport in every enterprise, city, and town."¹⁰⁸

The long range plan for the RSFSR in 1960 was "to train 1,000 sport champions, 10,000 first-grade, 68,000 second-grade and 387,000 third-grade sportsmen as well as 355,000 junior athletes."¹⁰⁹ The above plan was to be fulfilled via GTO. Massovost' was to be achieved by having 5,000,000 persons permanently engaged in sport in the primary organizations.

The reason managers in industry falsify records to get a lower quota can be seen by looking at the 1950 annual plan of the Ukrainian republic. In 1949 the Ukraine doubled the number of sportsmen. In 1950 they were expected to:

... establish 6,000 more physical culture circles and attract an additional 500,000 people to physical culture and sports. ... This year 220 district stadiums, 350 swimming pools and 600 soccer fields will be opened.¹¹⁰

By experiencing good success one year, the Ukraine was expected to increase its future successes. The physical education goals were set according to the theoretical capacity for the Ukraine to establish sporting organizations and increase participation.

The detail of annual plans is a factor in republics not reaching quotas. The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Ministry of Education and USSR undertook a plan approved by the Presidium of the Central Council. It included 26 major projects. It is doubtful all could be

achieved in one year and if they could, the question of the quality of the program could certainly be raised.

For 1960 Estonia was to meet the following requirements:

1. In April and May, 1960 hold a competition among the physical culture kollektivs of the secondary and seven-year schools for the best handling of extra-curricular mass athletic work among the students.
2. Central Council of Voluntary Sports Society of Students (DSoSh Noorus) assemblies of raion, city, and republic were to be organized in March and April.
3. Republic conferences of chairmen of school physical culture kollektivs on the problem of improving extra-curricular physical culture and athletics in the schools of the republic.
4. In April, the Presidium of the Council of the Union of Sports Societies and Organizations of the republic will consider the problem of improving the work of the voluntary sports societies -- Kalev, Iyyd, Dinamo, Trudovye Rezervy, Lokomotiv -- with school children, and the physical education of students, as well as the matter of rendering assistance to the Noorus society.
5. In May an organization to supervise athletic activities at apartment house administrative offices in cities at the republic level.
6. Increase in number, physical education teachers at elementary level.
7. Seminars to increase skills of teachers: 2-day for elementary, 6-10 day for secondary and seven-year schools.
8. Seven textbooks were to be published by the institute for advanced training of teachers acting jointly with methodology centre.

9. Ten hours devoted to physical education in month-long course for directors and heads of schools.
10. Physical culture Aktiv will be organized with the aid of sports societies and children's sport schools.
11. Establishment of consultation centres at large athletic facilities in cities and large raion centres, to assist public physical education instruction.
12. Sports for young people will be improved and developed.
13. Problems of early athletic specialization will be researched as will be a schedule of athletic measures for youth.
14. Program of competition for children and young people will be set up.
15. Program for producing athletic equipment.
16. Two-week sports camps during the summer vacation for 7,000 children.
17. Thirty per cent of students in grades 8-9 will be trained to qualify for GTO ratings.
18. Increase of children's sports schools, establishing children's sports groups and organizing mass teaching of swimming during summer.
19. Develop mass tourism for children so as many as 30,000 students can take hikes.
20. Five-day sports camp sessions for Komsomol and physical culture aktivs with participation of 1,500 persons.
21. Organize sports films and lectures from coaches and athletes in rural areas.
22. Continue program "The Club of Young Sports Fans" together with sports broadcasts for young people and children at least once a month.

23. Produce the television show "Interview With Veterans" and show educational films on sports.
24. Produce 15 mm. film to be titled "Study Well and Get Useful Recreation"; make up posters on athletic subjects for school children; publish education posters on sports found in BGT0 and GT0 programs; and hold a sports film festival during summer vacation.
25. Organize competition and exhibition of children's drawings on sports subjects.
26. Organize competition for the best song dealing with sports.¹¹¹

For the Estonian republic to fulfill all 26 resolutions would require the utmost in organization and efficiency. More often than not plans are impossible to fulfill if they are conducted adequately. Not only do they involve increasing athletic membership but construction of facilities, manufacture of equipment, writing of books, production of films, audio-visual programs and lectures, and upgrading of instruction.

Republics can delegate some obligations to the primary sports kollektivs or lower sports organizations. For instance, one year Moscow was given the duty of "increasing physical education groups from 2,552 to 4,000. One thousand, six hundred of these groups were to be on collective farms around Moscow." The same year, Arkhangelskaia province was given authority to:

... organize physical culture groups in all seven-year and secondary schools of Archangel, to put in order the teaching of physical culture in the first to fourth classes of primary schools and to raise the qualifications of teachers.¹¹²

Sporting magazines are also given plans to fulfill each year. Reporters are to write according to the policy of socialist realism discussed earlier. As well, they have other facets of sports to write on.

In 1949, Fizkul'tura i Sport was criticized for not carrying out the policies established for it. It was to provide news of physical culture and sports in the people's democracies and "... to print articles on the reactionary nature of sport in bourgeois lands."¹¹³

With the success of Soviet athletes in the 1952 Olympics, long-range plans were worked out for international athletes. Because USSR sportsmen had won 29 per cent of the medals at Helsinki, it was theoretically possible for them to win 34 per cent at Melbourne, 39.6 per cent in Rome and 50 per cent at Tokyo in 1964. (The team losses in Mexico have caused a reassessment of the long-range plan.)

The international athletes were to:

- 1) make political capital for the "superior socialist system" out of worldwide sports demonstrations of the victories, championships and records of Soviet athletes
- and 2) through a powerful plan, promote the physical and psychological preparation of the production forces for the communist expansion idea.¹¹⁴

Coaches of international athletes were expected to train reserve teams and work at high altitudes in preparation for the Mexico Olympics.

At the same time the five-year plan adopted by the USSR for research into physical culture and sport expected investigation into:

... acclimatization to environmental conditions in Mexico, maintenance of psychological well-being in sports activities and the elaboration and introduction of methods for providing immediate information through the use of cybernetics.¹¹⁵

In October 1919, the Komsomol resolved the long range plan of actively working with youth in developing physical culture and sports. Each year the Komsomol are given quotas to fulfill in this long-range plan. In 1949 the YCL was to help "draw more than 2,000,000 people into regular physical-cultural and sports activity and to train 3,620,000 for the Ready for Labor and Defence badge." They were also to:

... strengthen existing, and organize new, physical culture groups in enterprises and institutions, and especially in the villages, where the physical culture movement is still weak. They must see to it that mass competitions conducted this summer [1949] are well prepared and that stadiums, playgrounds and equipment meet the highest requirements.¹¹⁶

Komsomol officials continue to follow the resolution of 1949 in helping trade unions, physical culture organizations, and the military set up sports clubs and facilities. This allows the Party to infiltrate and control non-political organizations through quasi-political control -- Komsomol.

Factories and housing developments are expected to help meet sports plans. Articles seem to suggest quotas are rarely fully met. The Leningrad City Soviet was praised for the work physical education instructors were doing in housing projects and the seminars held for instructors. They were also criticized because of the physical education content and the tendency to reach younger children at the expense of older children. It seems there is never enough facilities or sports clubs, a constant source of criticism in sporting articles.

Many schools and factories do not rely on state funds and building groups to supply their equipment. A Moscow tool-plant was praised for "attracting the majority of its members into the physical culture movement

and building its own stadium, sports field, etc."¹¹⁷

As the above discussion shows, sports organizations are given long-range and short-range plans to fulfill. This is true at the All-Union level down to the primary sports kollektiv. Plan fulfillment brings with it praise from the Party organization and in many instances, greater material rewards. Therefore Soviet workers attempt to accomplish assigned objectives or create the illusion that the Plan has been completed.

Results of Planning in Sports

The results of plans have been much the same as other facets of Society society. Sports leaders hoard equipment, falsify recruitment records and generally do everything to create the facade of fulfilling the Party plan.

One of the greatest complaints of sportsmen and coaches is the inferior quality of equipment. Since plant managers are measured in terms of quantity of items produced, quality is often disregarded.

For example, an editorial in Izvestiia explained that Verkhotursk factory was obligated to produce 100,000 skates. The figure was unrealistic as only 6,373 pairs were produced. The poor quality of those produced was also criticized:

... Comrade Mukhachev, physical culture teacher of School No. 16 Serov, went ice-skating. He had to change his skates seven times that evening. All seven pair broke. The next day 23 new pairs of skates were given out at the rink. All 23 broke.

The same article complained about ski production as well. In the haste of reaching the quota, "the Serebryansk Industrial Combine of Kushvinsk

District produced 500 pairs out of unseasoned wood."¹¹⁸

Factory managers are so intent on reaching quotas faulty equipment is manufactured even when it is realized it is of little use. The satirical article of M. Manina points up this fact.

Volleyballs sold in the Kalinin Dynamo sporting goods shop have a peculiar property: they take on various forms when pumped up, pear-shaped, melon-shaped, lemon-shaped -- anything but spherical. Such balls never fly straight; they always go sideways. The leather covering is of varying thickness and strength. This is why the balls take on the wrong shape. After two or three games the covering tears. It becomes evident that the cover was sewn with weak thread and was not reinforced.

After complaining through official channels, "the balls received a new name, 'Amateur' and continued to be sold unchanged."¹¹⁹

Another complaint is that of the quota being unrealistic and impossible to achieve. For example, in 1956 there was to be an inter-republic sports competition. In order to provide the best possible competition and stimulate training of athletes, no person below a class I GTO rank could participate. Kazakh SSR had a quota of 29 swimmers to meet for the event but only had one of an acceptable standard.

The position is similar in the Tadzhik SSR, which has to provide 500 sportsmen of the required standard but has only 150. It is evident that there will have to be feverish activity in these republics if the required number of athletes is to be produced.¹²⁰

Usually these quotas were missed.

Sports equipment and physical education are often considered less important than other aspects of the Soviet economy. In May, 1970 Brezhnev stated:

We are in favour of clubs, especially in worker's settlements,

and we are in favour of stadiums -- let our young people engage in sports. But if this is done at the expense of appropriations for housing construction, to the detriment of the fulfillment of plans for opening housing space for occupancy, then, of course, we cannot tolerate such actions. We are obliged to solve problems in order of their acuteness and urgency.¹²¹

This means sports manufacturers often do not receive necessary material for equipment or facilities because a greater urgency appears elsewhere in the country.

For this reason, the Ministries of the Lumber and Paper Industry, Light Industry and Local Industry, and producers cooperatives do not allocate material for skates, skis, sports clothing or sports shoes. A greater priority for the raw materials appears elsewhere in the economy. Raw material is not used for the manufacture of sports items even though no equipment is available in many towns.

Priorities elsewhere in the country affects teaching as well. When the Bolsheviks came to power the vast majority of the Soviet population could neither read nor write. Under Stalin, the priority was for industrialization of the economy. Khrushchev considered the space race of utmost importance. For this reason many teachers were educated to teach in areas other than physical education.

Thus in the physical education classes of Arkhangelsk, the school inspector found

... the lesson disorderly and the pupils gaining little. The teacher was not equipped to teach the lesson. ... In the lower classes more than half the teachers concerned with physical education have not had the proper preparation. Few physical education teachers in the village, and a minority in the city, have come from pedagogical institutes.¹²²

Because the economy is geared for industry, few plants are equipped to handle the manufacture of sports equipment. In 1963, only one plant in the Soviet Union produced slalom skis. The Skiing Federation set the minimum necessary at 10,000 pairs per year. The factory produced 4,000. They were criticized because of this but little could be done about it.

Often facilities and equipment are not even provided. Kovrov established a rifle club according to the annual plan but had no range to shoot on! Many cases can be cited about the lack of equipment and facilities.

Clubs, Party organizations, trade unions, and Komsomol workers are expected to build facilities for themselves after establishing physical culture kollektivs. Because of priorities elsewhere and a lack of raw materials, facilities are forgotten. The Odessa Province Committee was criticized for doing this. After adopting resolutions to develop physical culture along the Black Sea, "no aquatic sports basin, yacht club or diving towers were built."¹²³

The drive to fulfill plans results in the falsifying of records. Because Party, government, and sport officials are considered primarily for their production output, it is not uncommon for this to occur. Therefore:

Many physical culture and sports groups exist only in name, without systematically concerning themselves with the people and especially youth.¹²⁴

Athletes themselves were found to have passed physical education tests but were "unable to swim or ski and were afraid of gymnastic apparatus."¹²⁵

This also means mass participation is overlooked for the sake of the elite athlete. In Izvestiia, for example, it was complained that:

... the work of a trainer or sports society or organization is usually rated according to the number of classified athletes and the places occupied in competitions. What use are the "old-timers"? Let them stick to morning gymnastics.¹²⁶

Another result of quotas being placed on sport is the failure of coaches to innovate. Since coaches are rated on the number of top athletes they produce, old established training methods are retained at the expense of newer innovations. This is analogous to developing new technology in industry. The Party has sacrificed technological advances in favour of centralized control. Managers meeting the quotas set by Moscow are rewarded. Therefore they are loathe to manufacture goods that may slow production for even a short time. The development of new products has suffered as a result. The failure to innovate in sports is evident in the criticism of international athletic coaches. The failure of Soviet athletes to win the required number of medals at the Mexico Olympics inferred this.

The severest criticism has been leveled at Soviet coaches, who are accused of employing outdated methods of selection and training. Several are charged with setting incorrect training schedules, as a result of which many Soviet athletes at Mexico were over-trained, while others were under-trained.¹²⁷

The planned economy results in a mass assault on a single sporting objective. Different sports tend to be ignored until their absence or weakness causes the CPSU to concentrate on them. Thus for example, in 1952 the Soviet Union was exceedingly strong in the military sports -- pentathlon, marksmanship, fencing -- but was weak in yachting, swimming

and tennis. These sports were ignored until it was necessary to improve them. A good example was swimming. Marin complained:

At the Seventeenth Olympic Games Soviet swimmers were very weak. Only five points and not a single medal. ... On a world scale our swimmers are, as before, far behind the accomplishments of the Americans in all styles of swimming and behind the Australians and Japanese in the free style.¹²⁸

To combat this weakness in swimming, a mass assault on the swimming program was undertaken.

The main emphasis was on training boys and girls in special schools. Fifty such schools were opened to train reserves for the national team and turn out from 100 to 150 new "masters of sport" aged 14-16. The best of these are to be chosen to compete for the Soviet Union in international matches.¹²⁹

A centralized economy has had more of a detrimental effect on sport than a beneficial one. The intense planning in itself is not disadvantageous. Sports administrators know exactly where they are going in any given period of time. The problem lies in trying to plan for the whole society, an impossible task for a nation as vast as the Soviet Union. In addition, the plan is always increased when it is fulfilled. It is better for sports organizations to under-produce so they receive a more realistic plan in the future.

Incentives in Sports

Because the Soviet economy does not operate on a profit motive, the Communist Party has implemented a complex system of incentives for citizens who meet Party obligations and administrative plans. "A system of prizes, orders and medals is utilized to recognize outstanding

work."¹³⁰ No where are these CPSU incentives so prevalent as in the sporting field.

Types of Incentives

Monetary Bonuses

Athletes achieving the Master of Sport rating receive monetary bonuses, allowing them to spend increasingly more time at sport.

The Soviet state assigns top athletes to sports clubs. The sports clubs give 6-10 year contracts to the athletes, find them suitable living quarters and

... a job with comparatively high income and enough training time. As the athlete improves his performance and climbs the ladder in the catalogue of sports achievement and classification, so he also climbs the social ladder with more money, more free time, and greater personal prestige.¹³¹

Iurii Rastvorov has stated athletes who hold the Master of Sports rating receive a special check each month. Further he says:

Should he be picked as the outstanding player of the year in his sport, he will get about 2,000 roubles a month. Should he be rated among the top ten players in his field, he will get perhaps 800-1000 roubles.¹³²

The monetary bonus system was introduced in 1945 to help aid athletic proficiency. At this time the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR -- now Council of Ministers -- gave the All-Union Council of Physical Culture and Sport permission to issue cash awards for outstanding athletic performances.

Thus for example, an award ranging from 15,000 to 25,000 rubles [would] be given for establishing a U.S.S.R. record that [surpassed] the world record, and from 5,000 to 15,000

rubles [would] be given for establishing a U.S.S.R. record.¹³³

The monetary system of incentives has progressed to the point that even non-international athletes receive payments. Izvestiia complained that second rank soccer players were receiving four times the wage of skilled workers for playing soccer for the Chelyabinsk Locomotive Works.¹³⁴

Better Jobs

Along with the monetary awards, athletes often are given non-existent jobs or jobs with little or no work attached to them. Riordan has stated:

Valeriy Brumel is a student, weight-lifter Yuriy Vlasov is a soldier, footballer Lev Yashin and gymnast Larisa Latynina are undergraduate of 10 years standing and Vladimir Kuts was a sailor.¹³⁵

It is doubtful whether any of the athletes did much more than train for their respective sports however. Likewise for the Novorossiisk ship repair yard soccer team. They were booked "as top-grade lathe operators, fitters and electricians, whereas they in fact only chased a ball."¹³⁶

Medals and Orders

The system of GTO allows all participants to achieve some kind of medal. As they progress towards the Master of Sport classification, the medals become more and more of a status symbol. As well as the state awards, there are numerous awards for children such as the "Golden Puck" award for proficiency in hockey and the "Leather Ball" in soccer. These provide incentives for children to continue playing

a particular sport.

The Soviet Union is also the only country in the world to award athletes its highest medals and orders.

After the Melbourne Olympics 27 Soviet sportsmen received the Order of Lenin. After the Olympic Games in Squaw Valley and Rome 317 orders and medals were awarded: 10 Orders of Lenin, 32 Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, 107 Orders of the "Badge of Honor", 63 medals "For Valiant Labor" and 105 medals "For Outstanding Labor."

More recently, after the XI Winter Olympic Games in Sapporo, Japan, 49 medals and orders were presented -- two Orders of Lenin, ten Orders of the Red Banner of Labour, 16 Orders of the "Badge of Honour", 16 medals for Labour Valour and five medals for Distinction in Labour.¹³⁷

Criticism of Incentives

Editorials periodically appear in Soviet newspapers criticizing this system of incentives. It is felt the state is playing favorites and condoning "parasitism" among athletes.

There is especially strong criticism from Party workers because of the number of medals awarded athletes for achievements in international competition. As previously mentioned the same medals are awarded to officials only after decades of faithful service to the Communist Party.

Significance of Incentives

The awarding of athletes in both monetary terms and high state orders goes much deeper than a Soviet citizen's success in an athletic competition.

Every time a Soviet athlete meets a western counterpart, the CPSU

views the contest as a clash between communism and capitalism. The advent of war between the two systems -- as predicted in Marx-Lenin teachings -- would simply mean utter destruction for both, particularly in the age of nuclear weapons. Therefore, this war has been transferred to the sports arena. Harold Connelly, the American hammer thrower, has stated: "To most of these countries, particularly Russia, this is war -- and they fight it like a war."¹³⁸ This idea of seriousness in sport has been engrained in Soviet youth for many years. Woody's comment in 1932 is as applicable today as it was then.

One is to exercise and play so that he may live and fight. ... They [Soviet youth] know, for they are told in a thousand ways, the class struggle must be served by healthy, strong bodies and that through exercises and games one is to be prepared for it.¹³⁹

Therefore any international victory by the Soviet Union is seen not only as a victory by an individual Soviet athlete but as a victory for the superiority of communism over capitalism.

Because athletes receive so many high honors, it can be argued that a gold medal in international competition is seen as more important than success in the Party apparatus at home. The high turnover rate of Party men discussed earlier causes inefficiency but it also indicates the system operates in such a way that the majority of Party officials can work in the Soviet system without prior knowledge or experience. This is not the case with athletes. International competitors must have the physical ability and stamina to train long hard hours. When the Soviet athlete achieves success, he is rewarded accordingly.

This does not mean athletes, coaches and even sports magazines

are beyond criticism of the Party. It is now necessary to deal with this criticism.

Criticism of Sportsmen, Trainers and Sports Publications

The field of Soviet sport is criticized for four reasons basically. They are: failure to fulfill Party plans, failure of coaches to adequately indoctrinate athletes in political thought, failure of athletes to win international competitions and improper behavior of Soviet athletes. Failure to fulfill Party plans has already been discussed in the section on administrative obligations of sports.

The second criticism is levelled at sports for failing to provide adequate political indoctrination of athletes.

Coaches are in much the same position as technical managers in industry. They are interested in the practical aspects of their work -- in the case of coaches, the training of athletes to perform as efficiently and successfully as possible. However, all technical managers have a counterpart with exactly the same authority, who is interested in the political indoctrination of workers. Often both managers "cover up for each other's sins and omissions in discharging the tasks for which they are held jointly responsible."¹⁴⁰ One manager may override his authority and place too much emphasis on his area of responsibility, however.

For example, in 1963 the political sports instructors issued a complaint to the USSO, in regards to the technical coaches' actions. They complained "that very often the sports managers [were] not

interested in the opinion of the Komsomol organizer on fundamental questions of team life." Further, as the person responsible for increasing ideological stability among athletes, they felt "they should be included in the trainers' councils which [chose] the teams who will represent the country."¹⁴¹

The political indoctrination of athletes is considered as important as the technical skills involved in the physical activity. The fact that political coaches help pick the Soviet international team members emphasizes this importance.

Political indoctrination is tied in with the concept of socialist realism. Soviet athletes are expected to act like "New Soviet Men". This is generally the image presented to western spectators. Soviet officials are anxious "that their sportsmen behave 'correctly' when competing in non-Communist countries by remaining immune to 'alien bourgeois influences'."¹⁴² Unreliable athletes would probably not be picked for international competitions.

Lack of political propaganda is often levelled at sport publications and USSO leaders. The chairman of the AUC was replaced with great frequency during Stalin's regime, presumably for lack of political reliability.

Consequently, USSO is to

... conduct its work for the education of athletes and sportsmen in a spirit of fidelity to Communist principles, Soviet patriotism [and] a profound respect for socially useful work in the spirit of the high moral principles embodied in the moral code of the builders of communism.¹⁴³

When this does not occur, the chairman is replaced.

Sports magazines and newspapers are criticized for not printing more articles on the bourgeois use of sport in western countries and for not criticizing athletes who do not display true socialist behavior. Sovetskii Sport was criticized in a Pravda editorial because it

... divorces sports performances from questions of ideological-educational work. ... The newspaper does not show how Soviet athletes, trainers, instructors and teachers study and raise their ideological level. ... Critical articles in Sovetskii Sport are superficial and do not touch upon the radical reasons for shortcomings. The newspaper has failed to produce bold and deep criticism of local physical culture and sport committees.

The editorial concludes by stating the newspaper should

... steadfastly follow the program outlined by the Party Central Committee, and become a genuine fighter for raising the ideological level as well as the skill level of Soviet sportsmen. It must struggle for a mass sports movement and educate sportsmen in the spirit of communist ethics, in the spirit of Soviet patriotism.¹⁴⁴

The third reason for criticism is the failure of athletes to win international competitions. When this occurs the system of training, the scientific research and the coaches themselves are all judged negatively. The top Party leaders, the Presidium of USSR and Soviet scientists all attempt to explain the cause of defeats.

If the defeats are too great, as was the case in the Mexico Olympics and 1970 World Cup series in soccer, top coaches are replaced. Both Gavril Korobkov, track and field coach and Gavril Kachalin, national soccer coach were replaced. For Kachalin, it was his second dismissal. He was also dismissed when the Soviet Union missed a semi-final place in the 1962 World Cup.

Lastly, athletes are severely reprimanded for behavior not in line

with the CPSU ideal of Soviet man. Frequently the very action criticized in non-Communist countries as bourgeois influence occurs in the Soviet Union. Examples of this behavior, and the disciplinary action taken, follow.

Disciplinary measures are much harsher than is found in capitalist countries. For example, Soviet hockey players Vladimir Polupanov and Valerii Vasilev were both cut from the national team in 1970 "for their conduct off the ice rather than for their play during matches."¹⁴⁵

Players from the Chernomorets soccer team of Odessa were criticized for their "high living, fast driving, rampant drunkenness and pampered treatment." It was suggested that the team "should be knocked off their pedestals and returned to the fold of the working class."¹⁴⁶

The Baku Neftyaniki, a first division team from the Azerbaijan republic were indeed "knocked off their pedestals." The entire team was banned from national competition for frequent altercations on and off the field. As well, three players were banned for life because of actions during a recent match that "bordered on a criminal offense."¹⁴⁷

Sportsmen and the sporting organizations must heed criticisms laid against them. Suspension from athletic pursuits means more than not participating. It also means a loss in the supplementary incentives that go with athletic success.

The constant cry for improvement that comes from the press is written for a more deeper meaning than showing the shortcomings of the sporting fraternity. The CPSU top leadership believes a new man will emerge from a communist society. By constantly bombarding the athletic society with criticism, the Party hopes to produce the behavior it

considers appropriate. If athletes can be won over to communism or at least be sympathetic to the cause, it will be much easier to win other non-Party masses both to athletics and to communism.

This policy is similar to the one used in government elections. Non-Party candidates are elected but are sympathetic to the Party cause. It is a logical policy in sports. Athletes are idolized in any country and the Soviet Union is no exception. Children tend to imitate their heroes. Therefore if their heroes are communist members or sympathetic to the cause, the children are likely to follow the example. This is just one more use of sports as a tool for the CPSU. The recruitment of athletes to further the Party cause is thus an important one. Recruitment and its results will be dealt with now.

Recruitment of Athletes

The Soviet Union emphasizes their policy of massovost' (mass participation) and masterstvo (proficiency). The massovost' principle was originally introduced as a means of improving worker's health, rallying the masses around the Party and teaching cooperation and teamwork. It was also stated that "talented athletes will sooner be found ... among millions than among thousands and that it is easier to find talented athletes among thousands than among hundreds."¹⁴⁸

Massovost' is to be the first step in the development of international competitors. Compulsory physical culture programs are to concentrate on the GTO classification and skills needed in sports. After school hours, children are to specialize at sports schools. The

sports schools are staffed by university-trained instructors. As the young athlete meets higher and higher qualifications in GTO he trains longer and more intensively -- masterstvo. By successfully competing in the spartakiads, athletes move on to international competitions.

This ideal has much merit and could well be the aim of every country. Unfortunately, the CPSU has distorted the principle. By emphasizing the masterstvo at the expense of massovost', the principle has lost its appeal. Soviet citizens realize masterstvo is more important in the Party's sight as the following discussion indicates.

Fallacy of the Broad Base

Sports in Schools

Physical education in the schools, in the majority of cases, consists of no more than calisthenics and simple games. This is particularly true in rural areas where physical culture has progressed little since the massovost' principle was introduced in 1925.

Woody, in 1930 viewing a physical culture class of fifth graders commented:

... thirty-five boys and girls with glowing faces were going through their marching, arm and leg bending, stretching, running and jumping exercises. Later they played a few games with evident, great enjoyment. The room was not built for a gymnasium, but was not bad for such a use. There was absolutely no special equipment; but there was a good master who put them through their exercises with snap and vigor.¹⁴⁹

Thirty years later, Stankin criticized the lesson he saw in the Kuibyshev region. The teacher, not trained in physical culture, had the children sitting at their desks "throwing a ball at a human head drawn on the blackboard." Part of the reason was the fact no school in the

region had an "equipped sports field during the 1959-60 school year."¹⁵⁰

In 1966, Riordan noted "Moscow has only a handful of soccer pitches that would pass Football League muster; few Russian schools have more than a makeshift gymnasium."¹⁵¹ Travelling in the Soviet Union in 1971, Riordan again found "80 per cent of schools [had] no sports grounds at all and 75 per cent [had] no gymnasiums."¹⁵²

The above comments point out the fact physical culture instruction in schools can achieve little more than calisthenics and simple games. Teachers have neither the equipment, training or the facilities to do much more.

Recruitment

The school situation would seem to retard the development of international competitors from the Soviet Union. This has not been the case.

Experienced physical culturists visit schools and choose students to attend special schools. The highly-talented youngster may attend a sports boarding school, which is a rather new innovation.

Choosing Potential International Competitors

Each trainer is assigned a certain number of schools to visit to observe children who may be potential champions. The trainer, along with the physical education teacher of the school

... choose the children according to their physical build and looks. Posture is important also. Those chosen children are tested and the final choice is made on the basis of test results as well as a doctor's examination and their success in school.¹⁵³

The fact children are chosen to attend sports schools breaks down the principle of massovost'. Children who need the extra incentive to continue, i.e., the weak, handicapped, unenthused, are never chosen. The system does not allow for late developers. This aspect has even been criticized in the Soviet Union. The magazine Fizkul'tura i Sport states:

The present system of training of young gymnasts is geared to the hunt for 9-10 year old child wonders "whom we pursue as though they were gods" while talented sixteen year-olds are completely ignored.¹⁵⁴

The low quality of physical culture in schools can be seen by looking at the training schedule of children in the sports schools. "The first two years a child spends in these schools are considered a preparatory period, that is, during this time most attention is paid to development of psycho-physical qualities -- development of feeling for good posture, rhythm, and movement to music."¹⁵⁵ Since the basic skills are to be taught in regular physical education classes, there should not have to be a two-year preparatory period. The fact that this period exists does not say much for the physical education in schools.

The sports schools are attached to the Ministries of Education of the republics, Soviet Ministry of Communications and to the voluntary sports organizations. The function of the sports schools is to help develop international athletes. The schools usually specialize in one sport, never more than two.

There is a further breakdown of athletes from the sporting schools. At the age of 17, athletes who have achieved a senior third class rating are eligible to attend the Sports Schools of Youth (SShM). The schools

are only open to those athletes, 17-23 years of age, who have achieved the necessary ranking.¹⁵⁶

A course of instruction lasts three years. Graduates must gain the title "Master of Sport" or at least a first class rating. These state-controlled schools are in fact concerned with preparing future champions and record winners on a large scale.¹⁵⁷

Master of Sport athletes are assigned to sports clubs and given ample time to train. At the start of a sport season or before an important event, all the star athletes are brought to special centres conducted by the USSR.

They, together with many other promising sportsmen, live in extremely pleasant circumstances so that they can devote themselves entirely to training without any material worries as if sport were their full time profession. Many Soviet champions and record winners have their own trainers, who are permanently attached to them and paid by the state.¹⁵⁸

The progression from children's sport school to Master Sportsman is not mass participation in the true sense of the term. It is simply a catering to the gifted athlete. The poorer athletes do not even stand much of a chance at the much-publicized spartakiads.

Spartakiads are held every four years before the Olympic Games. The object is to find athletes for the Soviet international teams. Ordinary sportsmen have no chance of making the team for several reasons. Firstly, they do not get time off as do Master sportsmen. Secondly, they probably have fewer and poorer facilities and equipment than the Master sportsmen. Thirdly, their coaching and training is poorer and they would most definitely not have a special individual trainer. As a result many republics send teams to the spartakiad but

only participate in the mass calisthenics demonstrations. Some athletes perform poorly because of lack of training.¹⁵⁹

Problems of Recruitment

The distortion of the original principle has brought with it criticism and problems.

Like the Party apparatus, in many cases, once picked for international competition, an athlete is there for as long as he desires. Iurii Marin criticized this practice shortly before the 1967 Winter Olympics.

Injection of fresh blood into our speed skating squad is hampered by the fact that the veteran team members have acquired too much authority. It seems that trainers are in some strange way mesmerised by names and titles.

Further on, speaking about Soviet sprinters, he complains, "one sees the same runners in the national team year after year. If any newcomers manage to get into the team, then they don't last very long."¹⁶⁰

The fact veteran athletes are kept on the team past their prime athletic years results in younger athletes becoming discouraged and dropping out. The above comment regarding young sprinters hints at this. In the same article, Marin states quite bluntly despite the growing popularity of gymnastics fewer young athletes are devoting themselves to it.

There is also a problem with physical educators and instructors. The lack of equipment and facilities for all but the gifted athlete means many educators strive to obtain training positions with international athletes or train their own competitors.

Physical culture and sport, thus, instead of serving as a means of improving the health and physical development of all pupils, become an end in itself, are replaced by the narrowly-directed sports training of single athletes, and the physical culture teacher is converted into a sports coach.

Those instructors entering the school system are often measured in terms of the school's success in athletic contests rather than what the "state of health and physical development of the main student body is like, and, how the mass physical culture work with them is organized."¹⁶¹

There are additional difficulties with the university and institute training of physical educators. They are trained for their own personal athletic perfection and for working with adults.

... insufficient attention is devoted both to theoretical and practical training for the teaching of physical culture to children and teen-agers and to the organization of extra-curricular mass sports activity.¹⁶²

Therefore many of the teachers in schools are not adequately trained to carry out massovost' since their own training has been towards masterstvo.

Students and adults alike, realize sport is not really meant for them. With the CPSU policy of increasing international supremacy, the average citizen has little hope of participating on a recreational basis.

Anita Glassl, for example, found workers over 25 years of age practiced sport eight or nine minutes a day. She found in the city of Krasnoyarsk workers spent only 4.4 percent of free time in sporting activities and concluded:

This may be ascribed to the fact that Soviet sports organizations aim not so much at providing the workers with an opportunity for recreation and self-expression as at producing

top-class competitive sportsmen.¹⁶³

The same phenomena occurred in the RSFSR. "The number participating in light athletics, skiing and swimming during 1956, have fallen by 89,000, 34,000, and 42,000 respectively."¹⁶⁴

The emphasis on the elite athlete has worried some Soviet officials. Dobrov, the deputy chairman of the Ukraine Committee of Youth Organizations has stated: "We criticize some of our sports leaders for putting such great emphasis on the development of champions."¹⁶⁵ Soviet coaches have not been sufficiently concerned with training young athletes because they have had superior athletes in most international events and competitions. These athletes are now getting older and there are few replacements. This may be part of the reason for Soviet failure at the Mexico Olympics.

The ideal of massovost' and finding athletes from the mass competitions has been cast aside. Riordan found the Soviet Union does not feel the present sports school structure is capable of providing enough international competitors. Instead of returning to the massovost' principle, the CPSU has taken a further step towards professionalism, with the creation of sports boarding schools.

The sports boarding school concept was introduced to the Soviet Union from East Germany. "Their aim is for pupils to obtain the school-leaving certificate in addition to proficiency in a particular sport. Boarders are accepted at 11 and stay on until the age of 18, a year beyond the normal school-leaving age."¹⁶⁶ The first boarding school in the USSR was opened in 1962 at Tashkent. After the initial

opening, more schools were built in each republic. It is estimated that there are 100 such institutions throughout the USSR. The schools lack nothing in the way of facilities or equipment. The Tashkent school, for example, has school grounds that "cover an area of 20 hectares, and include a three-hall wing for gymnastics, indoor and outdoor swimming pools, an indoor running track and a library which contains over 2,000 books on sport."¹⁶⁷ Schools usually specialize in one or two sports, the students receiving increasing work loads in sports theory and practice each year.

The significance of the sports boarding schools is that the ideal of mass participation has been ignored in favour of "elite athletes" and their pursuit of excellence. Individual pursuit of excellence is important for athletes but when 750 athletes are sent to boarding schools with a "teaching staff of 50 plus 17 qualified instructors"¹⁶⁸ as occurs in the Tallinn Boarding School, the mass of people are given little or no opportunity to participate.

Summary

The foregoing section has attempted to show the CPSU influence and control on sports. This influence can come directly from the Party apparatus or indirectly through other organizations. It may be subtle or obvious in nature. The important point to remember is that the Party is in control and as Khrushchev stated "all is subordinate to the Party."

The obvious nature of political influence is the structure of the sporting apparatus and its methods of operation. It is modelled after

the CPSU structure in organization and philosophy of rule, namely democratic centralism. Lower bodies are subordinate to higher bodies while the Party maintains control over all sports through the nomenklatura system. By placing Party members in positions of authority throughout the sporting organization, CPSU influence is assured.

More subtle control is exerted through Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The "correct" way of accomplishing things is to be found in this guide to action. Therefore it can be argued that sports are operated according to the principles of expediency and the operational code. Further, it can be argued that the Communist attempt to influence writers and painters to portray Soviet society according to socialist realism also occurs in sports, particularly the expected behavior of international athletes. The Party doctrine of scientific atheism may account, in part, for the predominance of scientific investigation in sports. These scientific studies have, no doubt, aided Soviet athletes in their phenomenal rise to international fame. It also has neglected the concept of sports as a spiritual experience and a means of spiritual and mental relaxation.

Party doctrine is propagated through sports and athletes. Sports are not considered as an end in themselves but as a tool to further some other Party cause. Athletes are considered workers in Soviet society. This causes much consternation among western sportsmen who view the state amateur as a professional.

Direct political intervention usually takes the form of resolutions passed at Party congresses. This intervention began with Lenin's resolution in 1919 giving the military responsibility for physical cultural

activity. It continued under Stalin with the establishment of the State Committee for Physical Culture and Sport of the Council of Ministers in 1936. Khrushchev again influenced sport organization in 1959 when he replaced Stalin's state organization with the Union of Sports Societies and Organizations of the Soviet Union.

Indirect control comes from the quasi-political and governmental bodies. The Komsomol, trade union and military organizations all have a direct involvement in sports and their presence assures the Party leadership of control of the non-Party masses. The government -- Council of Ministers -- jointly decides issues with USSR as well as providing state subsidies for voluntary sports societies and controlling the state-operated schools. Since the government is controlled by the Party, no authority in sports is left outside the realm of Party jurisdiction.

The results of this Party control has created an extremely well-organized physical culture movement with a very scientific basis and a great deal of practical research in the sports field. The greatest criticism of Soviet sport has been its deviation from the massovost' principle to the catering of the elite athlete and the masterstvo principle. The imbalance between coaching, facilities and equipment of the state amateur and the ordinary Soviet citizen has widened instead of narrowed. Also the use of sports as a tool rather than an end in itself is not necessarily desirable. Some of the ends are good -- as for example the fight against juvenile delinquency -- but many are not -- military preparedness, control of non-Party masses, superiority of Soviet state.

The administration of sports from the center -- Moscow -- accentuates the problems of a centrally-controlled society as a whole. Inefficiency, red tape and excessive bureaucracy are created in such a system. The unrealistic annual and five-year Plans present several problems. Plans are under-fulfilled, equipment is shoddy and of poor quality and records are falsified. The emphasis on heavy industry means consumer goods are neglected and in short supply. Sports facilities and equipment for the physical education teacher are scarce, particularly in the country. The absence of the profit motive has necessitated the creation of a system of incentives. In sports, the result has been undesirable in many cases. Athletes have developed characteristics and behavior which Soviet sources criticize in western countries as being a result of bourgeois influences.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The purpose of this thesis was to study the political involvement in sport in the Soviet Union and the consequences of this involvement in various aspects of Soviet sport. As is the case with all facets of Soviet life, sports is directly or indirectly controlled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Therefore any study of political involvement in Soviet sport also deals with the CPSU.

For this reason, the thesis began with the philosophy of Marx, the foundation of communist thinking. Lenin, as leader of the Bolshevik

Party, used Marxism as a guide of action towards overthrowing the tsarist regime in Russia. When this was accomplished in 1917, the Bolsheviks took control of the society, a control they have never relinquished.

The control of the USSR calls for a great deal of organization and authority in key positions of the country. The CPSU leadership assures this authority will remain with the Party organization by its system of nomenklatura. Nomenklatura is used both within the Party, government and public organizations. Thus, reliable Party members are placed in the key positions. This was brought out in chapter two with the discussion of the Party and governmental apparatus and in chapter three with the discussion of sports.

Central control brings with it disadvantages as well as advantages. As sport is a sub-culture within the larger cultural scheme of the Soviet Union, the advantages and disadvantages of central control can be investigated by looking at sport.

Control has also varied with the leadership of the Party. This is readily apparent when viewing sports. Under Lenin, there was more freedom than under Stalin. Sports reflected this freedom as non-political sports groups, although ostracized, were allowed to continue functioning in the early days of Bolshevik rule. With the Stalin dictatorship, sports were brought under state control and remained as such until Khrushchev denounced the regime as a "personality cult". With this denunciation sports were placed under public organization with Party control taking on a more subtle indirect nature. The indirect nature of this control is through the government which in turn is

controlled by the Party, as was pointed out in chapter two.

For the most part, sport material used in the study was of a secondary nature and thus had the limitation of presenting a western bias. This was taken into account during the writing and it is hoped it was overcome to a great extent. However since the thesis dealt with CPSU control, much of the material was found in texts dealing with Soviet politics and government. The authors of these texts are respected Soviet writers and tend to give facts without undue bias. Since sport can be regarded as a mirror of Soviet society, unbiased opinions of Soviet society, and therefore sport, can be discerned from studying the publications of these political scientists.

Valuable insights into Soviet sports were obtained during a visit to Soviet and East European countries in 1970. This provided many details in the writing. The experiences of Canadian athletes in competing with Soviet athletes also helped formulate some of the opinions found in the thesis.

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¹²Ibid.

¹³Figure adopted from Political Science 340 class notes.

¹⁴Organizational Charts, op. cit., p. 4. The "Radio Telegraph Station" of Figure Five may be an error of translation, for the RTS in rural areas could well be the "Repair-Technical Station".

¹⁵John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity: Government and Politics in the U.S.S.R., (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1971), p. 229.

¹⁶Organizational Charts, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁹The names are: Moldavia, Kolkhoznikul; Armenia, Kolntesekan; Azerbaidzhan, Mekhsup; Georgia, Kolmeurne; Belorussia, Urozhaii; Uzbekistan, Pakhtahor; Ukraine, Kolgozpnik; RSFSR, Urazhaii; Kazakhstan, Kairat; Turkmenia, Kolkhozohii; Tadzhikistan, Urozhaii; Kirgiz, Kolkhozchur; Latvia, Unknown; Lithuania, Nemunaz; Estonia, Nyud.

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³³Harasymiw, op. cit., p. 511.

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³⁶Time spent on sports training elicited during an interview with a sports school manager in Moscow, May 29, 1970.

³⁷Armstrong, Bureaucratic Elite, p. 60.

³⁸Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 138.

³⁹In American colleges athletes on scholarships are to receive room and board, tuition, books and laundry money. The same is true for Junior A. hockey players in Canada if they wish to remain amateur. Athletes often receive supplementary incomes over and above the required amount. These are usually given conspiratorially and can reach exorbitant proportions. It is rumored, for example, that Jean Beliveau, the outstanding centre of the Montreal Canadiens took a reduced salary to join the N.H.L. team. He was making more money playing for the Senior Amateur Quebec Aces.

⁴⁰Chris Catlin, Editorial, Lethbridge Herald, November 20, 1971, p. 10; Joseph A. Marchiony, "Rise of Soviet Athletics," Comparative Education Review, VII (June, 1963), p. 25; Komsomolskaia Pravda, "Parasitism in Sport," October 9, 1962, translated and quoted in Grigory V. Yuriev, "The Muscled Missionaries of Marxism: Sports as a Soviet Political Weapon," Analysis of Current Development in the Soviet Union, IX (1962-63), p. 2.

⁴¹Nadezhda K. Krupskaya, Memories of Lenin (1893-1917), (Bournemouth, England: Hardy Press, Ltd., 1930), p. 24.

⁴²Adam B. Ulam, The Bolsheviks: The Intellectual and Political History of the Triumph of Communism in Russia, (New York: Collier Books, 1965), p. 287.

⁴³Yury V. Marin, "Soviet Preparations for the Next Olympic Games," Soviet Affairs Analysis Service, No. 272 (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, May 7, 1963), p. 2.

⁴⁴Armstrong, Bureaucratic Elite, p. 60.

⁴⁵Raymond A. Bauer, "The Party Secretary," Nine Soviet Portraits, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1955), pp. 60-75. In his fictional story of the Party secretary, Bauer emphasizes the practices the secretary must do if he is to succeed.

⁴⁶Armstrong, Ideology, Politics and Government, p. 96.

⁴⁷Editorial, "A Matter of Great State Significance," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I (December 6, 1949), p. 57.

⁴⁸William Vandivert and Rita Vandivert, Young Russia, (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1960), p. 40.

⁴⁹Robert Daley, The Bizarre World of European Sports, (New York: William Marrow and Company, 1963), p. 15.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 119.

⁵¹Richards, op. cit., p. 65.

⁵²B. Ivanov and E. Rodikov, "Bourgeois Cosmopolitans in Sports Literature," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I (April 5, 1949), p. 56.

⁵³Athletes in all countries pay "lip service" to the accepted societal values in return for benefits the society gives them. This is particularly true of the Soviet Union. Often what is printed cannot be taken at face value and simply presents the point of view the CPSU wishes. For an example of the persecution of writers who refuse to accept these Party ideals see the introductions to Alexander Solzhenitsyn's books, For the Good of the Cause, trans. by David Floyd and Max Hayward (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), and One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, trans. by Max Hayward and Ronald Hingley (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963).

⁵⁴Dr. Alexander Matejko, sociologist, University of Alberta, has commented that much of the western world is unreal to the Soviet athletes. This psychological factor plus the group pressure minimizes defections to other countries. During the 1970 World Wrestling Championships at the University of Alberta, the Soviet team refused the training facilities that were provided. This could be viewed as an attempt to isolate athletes from outside contacts.

⁵⁵Richard B. Walsh, "The Soviet Athlete in International Competition," U.S. Dept. State Bulletin, XXV (December 24, 1951), p. 1007.

⁵⁶Pravda, January 30, 1949, translated and quoted in Yuriev, op. cit., p. 4.

⁵⁷Pravda, September 13, 1960, translated and quoted in Valeri M. Albert, "Soviet Athletes Disappoint the Party," Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, November 26, 1968), p. 1.

⁵⁸Valeri M. Albert, "Soviet Athletes Disappoint the Party," Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, November 26, 1968), p. 3.

⁵⁹Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 85.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 87.

⁶¹William B. Dickinson Jr., "Olympic Games," Editorial Research Reports, June 3, 1964, p. 414.

⁶²Richard B. Walsh, "The Soviet Athlete in International Competition," U.S. Dept. State Bulletin, XXV (December 24, 1951), p. 1009; Fizkul'tura i Sport, (No. 1, 1967), p. 2, translated and quoted in Yuri V. Marin, "Soviet Sport Falls Short of the Party Mark," Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, May 8, 1967), p. 2; Henry Morton, "The Politics of Sports," New Leader, XLIII (April 4, 1960), p. 17; Richards, in Soviet Chess, Also cites an example of Soviet chess preparations for the 1953 Zurich candidate's tournament, pp. 162-163.

⁶³Walsh, op. cit., p. 1008.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Jack Scott, "It's Not How You Play the Game, But What Pill You Take," New York Times Magazine, October 17, 1971, p. 107.

⁶⁶Albert, op. cit., p. 5.

⁶⁷Yury V. Marin, Soviet Preparations for the Next Olympic Games, p. 4.

⁶⁸It is not only the Soviet teams that use ergogenic aids. All nations are guilty of this practice. It can be argued that the Soviet Union can justify these means because of the operational code however.

⁶⁹For more detail of Soviet training methods see Anatoli Tarasov, Road to Olympus, (Toronto: Griffin House, 1969), pp. 21-45. Former Canadian national player, Roger Bourbonnais, mentioned the fact about player dossiers and the Russian players all skating in the Bobby Hull style with their legs wide apart. This style lowers the centre of gravity and gives greater balance.

Jerry West, National Basketball Association star recalls that he was continually being photographed by the Soviets on one of their American tours. Several years later, the Soviet basketball team returned, all having perfected Jerry West's jump shot - he is considered to have a perfect textbook style.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to enter into the voluminous material on the scientific aspects of sport in the Soviet Union. For those interested see: "New Methods in Education and Sports," Joint Publications Research Service, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, January 15, 1965). S.P. Letunov and R.E. Motylyanskaya, "The Need for a Proper Training Program," Joint Publications Research Service, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, September 7, 1962).

"News of Soviet Conferences on Physical Culture," Joint Publications Research Service, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, November 25, 1960.

"Results of the Scientific Investigations of Physical Culture Institutes During 1960," Joint Publications Research Service, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, September 7, 1961).

"Soviet Physical Culture," Joint Publications Research Service, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, September 26, 1960).

L.P. Matveyev, "Development of the Scientific Principles of Soviet Sports (General Theory)," Joint Publications Research Service, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, April 16, 1968).

Nikolai Ozolin, "The Soviet System of Athletic Training," International Research in Sport and Physical Education, ed. by E. Jokl and E. Simon, (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1964).

V. Patsyukov, "First All-Union Conference on Game Theory," Joint Publications Research Service, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, July 9, 1969).

⁷⁰Marin, Soviet Preparations for Next Olympic Games, p. 4.

⁷¹The author distinguishes between the state amateur and professional in the North American sense of the word. The state amateur retains a job allowing him to spend as much time as possible training in his particular sport. For instance Sovetskii Sport, January 29, 1972, gives the occupation of 18 Olympic hockey players as soldiers. The other three are students. It is unlikely any of the hockey players spend much time in army duties; they also materially gain from their position. However, they are different from professionals in that they cannot dictate salaries, refuse to sign contracts so as to join another team and demand large sums of money for advertising. In one sense, they are amateurs as is the North American athlete on a scholarship at a university or the Junior A hockey player who earns \$300 per month.

⁷²Morton, op. cit., p. 70. The IOC rules that the Soviet Union would have to abide by are discussed in Marchiony, op. cit., p. 83.

⁷³Sovetskii Sport, April 16, 1955, translated and quoted in Morton, op. cit., p. 83.

⁷⁴S. Yu.Volk, "Physical Culture in the USSR," Bulletin . Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, I (November, 1954), p. 12.

⁷⁵"Analysis of the USSR Athletic Program," Joint Publications Research Service, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, August 21, 1964), p. 4.

⁷⁶Reshetar, op. cit., p. 291.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 292.

⁷⁹Jack Scott, The Athletic Revolution, (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 224.

⁸⁰Iurii Mashin, translated and quoted in Yury Marin, "Soviet Sport on the Eve of Tokyo," Bulletin . Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, II (September, 1964), p. 42.

⁸¹Jim Riordan, "This Man Korobkov," World Sport, XXXII (April, 1966), p. 17.

⁸²Nikolai Ozolin, "The Soviet System of Athletic Training," International Research in Sport and Physical Education, ed. by E. Jokl and E. Simon (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1964), p. 472. It has been argued that knowledge of this sort has no bearing on athletic performance. A kinesology professor may know everything about an efficient running style and still not be a successful sprinter; whereas Bob Hayes did everything wrong as far as style was concerned and was a World Champion.

⁸³Riordan, op. cit., p. 15. This view is also cited in Fizkul'tura i Sport, (No. 4, 1962), p. 23, translated and quoted in Y. Marin, "Soviet Sports Prowess and its Political Aspect," Bulletin . Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, II (May, 1955), pp. 41-42.

⁸⁴Riordan, op. cit., p. 17.

⁸⁵Dr. A.V. Korobkov, Sportivnaia zhizn Rossii, (No. 6, 1964), p. 7, translated and quoted in Marin, Soviet Sport on Eve of Tokyo, p. 43.

⁸⁶G. Korobkov, Legkaia Atletika, (No. 12, 1964), p. 26, translated and quoted in Sigmund Wolk, "The Forthcoming 'Match of Giants': A Forecast of the July 31-August 1 USA-USSR Dual Meet in Kiev," Analysis of Current Development in the Soviet Union, (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, July 20, 1965), p. 3.

⁸⁷Fizkul'tura i Sport, (No. 1, 1967), p. 16, translated and quoted in Yuri V. Marin, "Soviet Sport Falls Short of the Party's Mark," Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, May 8, 1967), p. 3.

⁸⁸Fizkul'tura i Sport, (No. 3, 1959), p. 28, translated and quoted in Y. Marin, "Secrets of Success in Soviet Sport," Bulletin . Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, VII (August, 1960), p. 51.

⁸⁹Marin, Secrets of Success of Soviet Sport, p. 49.

⁹⁰"O deiatel'nosti instruktorov po sportivnoi i kul'turno-massovoi rabote s det'mi i podrostkami pri zhilishchno-eksplyatatsionnykh kontorakh," Bulletin' ispolnitel' nogo komiteta Leningradskogo gorodskogo Soveta (No. 1, ianvar', 1970), pp. 4-6.

⁹¹N.I. Ponomarev, "Free Time and Physical Education," International Review of Sports Sociology, (Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1966), p. 167.

⁹²Leonard Schapiro, "Keynote - Compromise," Problems of Communism, XX (July-August, 1971), p. 3.

⁹³Anita Glassl, "The Free Time of the Soviet Worker," Bulletin . Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, XVI (January, 1969), p. 22.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 26.

⁹⁵Reports of the final Spartakiad events were reported in Sport in the USSR (September, 1971).

⁹⁶"Brundage on Soviet Sports," New World Review, XXII (October, 1954), p. 19.

⁹⁷Seymour M. Rosen, "Basic Military Training in Soviet Schools," School and Society, XCV (November, 1970), p. 422.

⁹⁸Yuri Rastvorov, "Red Amateurs Are Pros," Life (June 6, 1955), p. 93.

⁹⁹Joseph A. Marchiony, "Rise of Soviet Athletics," Comparative Education Review, VII (June, 1963), p. 20.

¹⁰⁰Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System Works: Cultural, Psychological and Social Themes, (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 249.

¹⁰¹Reshetar, op. cit., p. 267.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Bauer et. al., op. cit., p. 249. For a more complete picture of problems of fulfilling plan see Raymond A. Bauer, "The Factory Manager," Nine Soviet Portraits, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1955).

¹⁰⁴Nikiforov, op. cit., p. 22. Morton explains the detailed long range aspects of a seven-year plan in his article. Henry Morton, "The Emergence of Soviet Sports," New Leader, XLIII (December 5, 1960), pp. 19-20.

¹⁰⁵J.S. Calvert, R.E. Morgan, and C. Sayer, "Physical Education and Sport in the Soviet Union," University of Leeds Institute of Education Research and Studies, XXI (September, 1961), p. 9.

¹⁰⁶Yuriev, Muscled Missionaries of Marxism, p. 3.

¹⁰⁷The length of time to obtain each classification has even been planned. Ozolin states: "...the path of the novice to the 3rd category rating takes an average of one to two years, from 3rd to the 1st category two to three years, and from the 1st category to the masters title two to three years." Ozolin, op. cit., p. 472.

¹⁰⁸Iurii Mashin, Legkaia Atletika, 1966, p. 1, translated and quoted in Yuri V. Marin, "Soviet Sports Feeling the Effects of Rejuvenation," Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, July 26, 1966), p. 4.

¹⁰⁹Sportivnaia zhizn Rossii, (No. 1, 1960), p. 15, translated and quoted in Marin, Secrets of Success of Soviet Sport, p. 50.

¹¹⁰N. Degtyarev, "Sports in the Ukraine," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, II (June 3, 1950), p. 58.

¹¹¹"Soviet Physical Culture," Joint Publications Research Service, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, September 26, 1960).

¹¹²"Meeting of the Moscow Province Physical Education," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I (June 21, 1949), p. 69.

"On the Physical Education of School Children," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I (May 3, 1949), p. 69.

¹¹³Editorial, "Report by Editor of the Magazine Fizkul'tura i Sport," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I (November 15, 1949), p. 11.

¹¹⁴Analysis of USSR Athletic Program, op. cit., p. 5.

¹¹⁵Marin, Soviet Sports Feeling the Effects of Rejuvenation, p. 5.

¹¹⁶Editorial, "Successfully Carry Through the Sports Summer," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I (June 7, 1949), p. 69.

¹¹⁷"In the Presidium of the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I (August 23, 1949), p. 61.

¹¹⁸Safonov, V., "On Skates and Skis," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I (February 15, 1949), p. 67. This writer was allowed to examine the equipment of the Soviet Union second team when they played an all-star team at the University of Alberta. It was crudely made in comparison to Canadian equipment. The shoulder pads in particular were like football pads rather than the ones Canadian players are used to. Later the same day, one of the Soviet players was seen in a local sports store, buying skates. He bought the only pair left at that time - it was early spring - although several sizes too large. He wore them in the game that night. This may suggest that a large ill-fitting Canadian skate is better than a snug-fitting Soviet skate.

¹¹⁹"Amateur Volleyballs," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I (September 6, 1949), p. 50.

¹²⁰Sovetskii Sport, April 5, 1955, translated and quoted in S. Yu. Volk, "The 1956 Soviet Inter-Republic Sports Competition," Bulletin . Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, II (August, 1955), p. 48.

¹²¹Brezhnev, L., "Brezhnev in Kharkov: The Economy," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XXII (May 12, 1970), p. 7.

¹²²D. Popel, "On the Physical Education of School Children," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I (March 1, 1949), p. 62.

Kudryavtsev complains that physical education funds are often appropriated together with funds for visual aids. More often than not, the total budget goes for visual funds. E.V. Kudryavtsev, "Overcome the Underestimation of the Physical Training," Soviet Education, I (August, 1959), p. 18.

¹²³Editorial, "For Mass Physical Culture and High Sports Proficiency," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I (August 2, 1949), p. 637.

¹²⁴Editorial, "For Further Physical Culture and Sport," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, I (February 8, 1949), p. 61.

¹²⁵A. Zavadsky and Y. Marin, "Physical Education and Sport in the USSR," Bulletin . Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, IX (November, 1962), p. 42.

¹²⁶Izvestiia, April 18, 1968, translated and quoted in Glassl, op. cit., p. 25.

¹²⁷Albert, op. cit., p. 5.

¹²⁸Fizkul'tura i Sport (February, 1962), pp. 28-29, translated and quoted in Marin, Soviet Preparations for the Next Olympic Games, p. 3.

¹²⁹Fizkul'tura i Sport (February, 1962), pp. 28-29, translated and quoted in Y. Marin, "Soviet Sports Prowess and its Political Aspect," Bulletin . Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, II (May, 1955), p. 42.

¹³⁰Fainsod, op. cit., p. 416.

¹³¹"Analysis of USSR Athletic Program," op. cit., p. 4.

¹³²Rastvorov, op. cit., p. 97.

¹³³John N. Washburn, "Sport as a Soviet Tool," Foreign Affairs, XXXIV (1955-56), p. 498.

¹³⁴Marin, Soviet Sport Falls Short of Party Mark, p. 6. While visiting the Jubilee Indoor Stadium and Rink, June 1, 1970, one of the National Skating coaches mentioned to this writer the incentives even for children. Children with First Youth Degree Classification in figure skating got skates supplied. Children below this classification had to buy their own.

¹³⁵Jim Riordan, "66 Million Competitors," World Sport, XXXII (June, 1966), p. 11.

¹³⁶Izvestia, September 9, 1962, translated and quoted in Grigory V. Yurev, "Soviet Sport as a Political Weapon," Analysis of Current Developments in Soviet Union, (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, October 30, 1962), p. 1.

¹³⁷Yurev, Soviet Sport as a Political Weapon, p. 2-3; Sovetskii Sport, March 4, 1972.

¹³⁸Harold Connolly, quoted in Morton, Soviet Sport, p. 38.

¹³⁹Thomas Woody, New Minds: New Men? - The Emergence of the Soviet Citizen, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 410.

¹⁴⁰Fainsod, op. cit., p. 388.

¹⁴¹Marin, Soviet Preparations for Next Olympic Games, p. 2.

¹⁴²Grigory V. Yurev, "Mass Preparations for the 1964 Olympic Games," Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, November 12, 1963), p. 6.

¹⁴³Sovetskii Sport, May 29, 1964, translated and quoted in Marin, Soviet Sport on the Eve of Tokyo, p. 42.

¹⁴⁴"Aloof From Major Issues," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, II (March 18, 1950), p. 49.

¹⁴⁵Editorial, "Russians Discipline Two Hockey Stars," Edmonton Journal, December 16, 1970, p. 51.

¹⁴⁶Editorial, "Cars, apartments and money for 'amateur' soccer team," Toronto Globe and Mail, July 21, 1971, Section 3, p. 24.

¹⁴⁷Chris Catlin, Editorial, Lethbridge Herald, November 20, 1971, p. 10.

¹⁴⁸Mikhail Kalinin, translated and quoted in Washburn, op. cit., p. 494.

¹⁴⁹Woody, op. cit., p. 431.

¹⁵⁰M. Stankin, "The Physical Education of Schoolchildren," Soviet Education, III (October, 1961), p. 54.

¹⁵¹Riordan, 66 Million Competitors, p. 10.

¹⁵²Jim Riordan, "Comes the Revolution," World Sport, XXXVII (March, 1971), p. 45.

¹⁵³Borislav Bajin, "Children's Schools for Sports and Gymnastics in the USSR," Fizicka Kultura, XXI (January, 1967), translated by Mila Grgurevic for Modern Gymnast, January, 1967, p. 10.

The test used is an endurance test. Children are expected to also have some sporting achievement to their credit.

¹⁵⁴Fizkul'tura i Sport, (January, 1967), p. 16, translated and quoted in Marin, Soviet Sport Falls Short of the Party Mark, p. 3.

¹⁵⁵Bajin, op. cit., p. 10.

¹⁵⁶Examples of rankings of a track and field school in 1960 were: (100 metres) Third Class, 12.1 seconds; Second Class, 11.4 seconds; First Class, 10.8 seconds; Master of Sport, 10.4 seconds.

¹⁵⁷Volk, Physical Culture in the USSR, p. 11.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., p. 12. This writer observed an example of this in Czechoslovakia. The Czech national nordic ski team was brought together for one and a half weeks for pre-season training. They trained in the well-equipped Ustredni Skola outside Prague.

¹⁵⁹Sport in the USSR, (September, 1971) has photographs of winners in the 1971 Spartakiad. The majority are veteran international performers, such as gymnast Mikhail Voronin.

¹⁶⁰Komsomolskaia pravda, February, 1967, translated and quoted in Marin, Soviet Sport Falls Short of Party Mark, p. 2.

Legkaia atletika, (November, 1966), p. 2, translated and quoted in Marin, Soviet Sport Falls Short of Party Mark, p. 3.

¹⁶¹Kudryavtsev, op. cit., p. 17.

¹⁶²Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁶³Glassl, op. cit., p. 25.

¹⁶⁴Sovetskii Sport, March 24, 1955, translated and quoted in Volk, The 1956 Inter-Republic Sports Competition, p. 47.

¹⁶⁵Dobrov, quoted in Frank S. Minnerly, "Physical Education and Recreation in Soviet Russia," Journal of the Canadian Association for Health, Physical Education and Recreation, XXVII (February-March, 1961), p. 5.

¹⁶⁶Riordan, Comes the Revolution, p. 45.

¹⁶⁷Ibid.

¹⁶⁸Ibid.

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